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ARTICLE 
THE VALUE OF THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE:  
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 
JONATHAN KLICK† & GIDEON PARCHOMOVSKY†† 
Property theorists have long deemed the right to exclude as fundamental and 
essential for the efficient use and allocation of property. Recently, however, proponents 
of the progressive property movement have called into question the centrality of the 
right to exclude, suggesting that it should be scaled back to allow the advancement of 
more socially beneficial uses of property. Surprisingly, the debate between the proponents 
and detractors of the right to exclude is devoid of any empirical evidence. The actual 
value of the right to exclude remains unknown. 
In this Article, we set out to fill this void by measuring, for the first time, the 
value of the right to exclude. To that end, we use the passage of the Countryside and 
Rights of Way Act of England and Wales in 2000 as a natural experiment to provide 
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empirical insight into this issue. We show that the Act’s passage led to statistically 
significant and substantively large declines in property values in areas of England 
and Wales that were more intensively affected by the Act relative to areas where less 
land was designated for increased access. While property prices might not capture all 
social value, our findings provide a critical input to the debate regarding access to private 
property. Given that the access rights provided by the “right to roam” included in the Act 
represent seemingly minimal intrusions on private property, our findings indicate that 
property owners view even small restrictions on their right to exclude very negatively. 
We believe that our findings are of significant importance to lawmakers in the 
United States, as they provide an empirical basis for policymaking in the realms of 
property and land use. In the United States, private property rights enjoy constitutional 
protection under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Hence, any attempt to 
formalize a general right to roam or other intrusions on the right to exclude may require 
the government to pay just compensation to affected property owners. Our study suggests 
what the just compensation amounts are likely to be. This information would allow 
lawmakers to make better decisions about the social desirability of various land use 
measures. We would like to emphasize that our findings should not be read as a call 
against the adoption of a right to roam or any other public privilege. Our only goal is 
to furnish a needed empirical foundation that would permit lawmakers to conduct a 
more precise cost–benefit analysis of different policies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In one of the most famous sentences in the history of property law, 
William Blackstone described property as “that sole and despotic dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in 
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total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”1 Importantly, 
in this statement, Blackstone did not advance an original conception of 
property. Nor was it a normative statement. Rather, Blackstone’s comment was 
descriptive. It accurately reflected the property conception that prevailed at 
his time. 
Although Blackstone’s view is often ridiculed by contemporary property 
scholars for being too extreme, when he originally offered it, there was nothing 
remarkable about it; it was neither radical nor revolutionary. In fact, the root 
of the property conception that puts the right to exclude at its core goes back 
to Roman law. Roman property law was organized around the principle of a 
single owner with a full dominion over an asset or a resource.2 Furthermore, 
as Yun-chien Chang and Henry Smith observe in their comparative study of 
civil and common law property, even though the two legal systems grew out 
of very different traditions and use different property concepts, 
ownership under the civil law and fee simple ownership of land in the 
common law system (and for the most part the respective notions of full 
ownership of personal property) coincide to a remarkable extent in their basic 
features: a possessory right to prevent invasions subject to qualifications such 
as for necessity, and supplemented by duties (for example, for lateral support 
or to shovel sidewalks).3 
In the 1920s and 1930s, the primacy of the right to exclude to the 
understanding of property was challenged by the rise of the legal realism 
movement that endorsed and popularized the conception of property as a 
malleable “bundle-of-rights.”4 The realists advocated a non-monolithic, 
highly contextual and relational view of property and, chiefly, inveighed 
against the claim that property has any definitive conceptual characteristics. 
Yet, even notable legal realists such as Felix Cohen conceded that the right to 
exclude is indispensable to all property relationships.5 Similarly, the Oxford 
 
1 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
2 See Juan Javier Del Granado, The Genius of Roman Law from a Law and Economics Perspective, 
13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 301, 316 (2011) (“Roman property law typically gives a single property 
holder a bundle of rights with respect to everything in his domain, to the exclusion of the rest of 
the world.”). 
3 Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law 
Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2012). 
4 For a detailed discussion of the bundle-of-rights metaphor and its intellectual roots, see Jane 
B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in Property Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 57, 62-67 (2013). 
For a powerful criticism of the bundle-of-rights conception, see Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 397-98 (2001), which 
concludes that the bundle-of-rights conception ignores the in rem dimension of property rights. 
5 See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 370-71 (1954) 
(stating that although the concept of private property may or may not involve the rights to use and 
sell the property, it indisputably involves a right to exclude others from doing something). 
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philosopher A.M. Honoré, who may have developed the definitive account 
of the “property bundle” by enumerating as many as eleven incidents that 
come under the definition of the term ownership,6 is understood to have 
privileged the right to exclude.7 
More importantly, the Supreme Court, while adopting the bundle of 
rights conception, has emphasized the centrality of the right to exclude in its 
rulings. For example, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the Supreme Court 
stated that the owner’s right to exclude others from her land is “one of the 
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized 
as property.”8 
It is important to note at this point that the “bundle of rights” conception 
was not universally accepted. Many legal scholars9 and philosophers10 rejected 
it and, instead, steadfastly adhered to the traditional view that positioned 
exclusion at the center of our property system. Economists, too, have treated 
the right to exclude as the keystone right, explaining that it is essential to the 
efficient use of resources11 and to the successful functioning of markets and 
the economy.12 
Recently, the right to exclude has come under another scholarly attack due 
to the rise of the “progressive property movement.” Pioneered by Gregory 
Alexander, Eduardo Peñalver, Joseph Singer, and Laura Underkuffler, and 
joined by many other prominent scholars, the progressive property movement 
 
6 See A.M. Honoré, Ownership (describing the necessary ingredients in ownership, or, in other 
words, the bundle of rights that accompany property ownership), in THE NATURE AND PROCESS 
OF LAW 370, 370-75 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993). 
7 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 1835, 1836 n.3 (2006) (suggesting that Honoré believed that “humans are hardwired to want to 
exclude others from their property”). 
8 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
9 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 754 (1998) 
(“[P]roperty means the right to exclude others from valued resources, no more and no less.”); cf. 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability and Automatic 
Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 600 (2008) (emphasizing that, to be meaningful, the 
idea of property “must contain, at a minimum, some element of exclusion,” but noting that the 
objective of the article “is not to argue that the right to exclude is all that there is in property”). 
10 See, e.g., J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 13 (2003) (arguing that property should be 
conceived of as comprising items that are the “subject of direct trespassory protection”); J.E. 
PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 68 (1997) (asserting that property rights can be entirely 
explained using the concepts of exclusion and use). 
11 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 356 (1967) 
(noting that an owner, by virtue of his power to exclude others, has “incentives to utilize resources 
more efficiently”). 
12 See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 48 (4th ed. 1984) (“The market can function only in a situation where the ‘exclusion 
principle’ applies, i.e., where A’s consumption is made contingent on A’s paying the price, while B, 
who does not pay, is excluded. Exchange cannot occur without property rights, and property rights 
require exclusion. Given such exclusion, the market can function as an auction system.”). 
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presents a pluralistic view of property designed to accommodate and promote 
a myriad of incommensurable values.13 While the view advanced by progressive 
property scholars has much in common with the writings of the legal realists of 
the 1920s and 1930s, there are important differences between the two 
movements. The focus of legal realism was mainly conceptual, while the 
ambition of the progressive property movement is unabashedly normative: it 
calls for the furtherance of such values as civil responsibility, environmental 
stewardship, life, human flourishing, autonomy, freedom, and “individual and 
social well-being.”14 Furthermore, the progressive property movement 
statement contains a call to change property law so as to “promote the ability 
of each person to obtain the material resources necessary for full social and 
political participation.”15 Yet, as Ezra Rosser explained, the gist of the 
progressive property concept is “to recognize more exceptions to the default 
rights of an owner to exclude, or put differently, to expand recognition of the 
public’s interest in privately held property.”16 Accordingly, we refer to 
progressive property scholars as the “pro-access camp.” 
The alternative to progressive property can be dubbed exclusion 
essentialism, and it is central to the work of scholars such as Thomas Merrill 
and Henry Smith alone and together. Merrill and Smith do not value 
exclusion in its own right. Rather, they view it as an important organizing 
principle that enables parties to economize on information and transaction 
costs. The exclusion approach allows for delineation of clear rights and 
boundaries at a relatively low cost and as befits in rem rights that avail against 
the rest of the world. The economies achieved through exclusion enhance the 
value of resources and minimize the potential for conflict. Throughout this 
Article, we refer to champions of this approach as the “pro-exclusion camp.” 
Nowhere are the fault lines between the two camps clearer than in the 
context of the right to roam. The right to roam, also known as “everyman’s 
right,” permits the public at large to venture into private property for 
recreational purposes. In countries in which the right is recognized, private 
property owners are not allowed to bar members of the public from entering 
their land or from using it for recreation. The right to roam is of ancient 
provenance in the Nordic countries of Finland, Iceland, Sweden, and Norway, 
as well as in Baltic countries and Scotland. In 2000, it was codified in England 
and Wales, and, in 2003, it was enacted in Scotland. Celebrating this trend, 
 
13 See Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S. 
Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 744 (2009) (asserting that 
values implicated by property “cannot be adequately understood or analyzed through a single metric”). 
14 Id. at 743. 
15 Id. at 744. 
16 Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. L. 
REV. 107, 145 (2013). 
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Greg Alexander argued that willingness to recognize the right to roam could 
be used as a measure of the degree of democratization in a given society.17 
Taking a markedly more guarded approach to the issue, Henry Smith 
cautioned that “giving the right-to-roam stick to a neighbor or to the public 
affects the value of the remaining property.”18 
Remarkably, this crucial scholarly debate that engulfed the world of 
property remains, to date, purely theoretical. The arguments of each camp 
are completely devoid of empirical support. But what is the value of the right 
to exclude? How sensitive is the right to exclude to incursions of the type 
sanctioned by the right to roam, and how much value, if any, stands to be lost 
if the right to roam is formalized? 
In this Article, we exploit the passage of a right-to-roam statute in 
England and Wales in 2000 to analyze the net change in the price of real 
estate affected by this abridgement of the right to exclude. Comparing areas 
where there was likely to be little effect of the law with areas where the expected 
effect was greater, we find that property values declined substantially, and the 
effect appears to be causal. To the extent that access rights and exclusion rights 
are capitalized into real estate values, this suggests that the loss of exclusion 
rights dominates the increase in access rights. We believe this is the first 
formal econometric evaluation of these competing interests. 
A cautionary note is in order here. Our findings should not be interpreted 
as a flat-out rejection of the right to roam or the general extent to which 
society values access relative to exclusion. Our goal was to measure the cost 
to property owners of increased access. It is possible, of course, that the 
benefits to the general public from increased access exceed this cost if the 
access rights of individuals outside of the local real estate market are highly 
valued but are not capitalized into local real estate values through, for 
example, increased tourism revenue and local employment effects. Also, a 
comprehensive cost–benefit analysis must take into account the subjective 
value to roamers, who can now engage in their beloved activity more freely 
and extensively, as well as the option value to non-roamers who know they 
could roam. These values are highly subjective and are thus often difficult to 
measure. For this reason, we focus on the cost side of the equation. 
Granted, information about the loss to private property owners from legal 
interventions that compromise their exclusion rights does not furnish a 
complete basis for assessing new policies, but it does provide lawmakers with 
an important benchmark against which to measure the potential benefits that 
 
17 See generally Gregory S. Alexander, The Sporting Life: Democratic Culture and the Historical 
Origins of the Scottish Right to Roam, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 321 (using the public’s right to roam as a 
lens through which to examine the democratization of society in Scotland). 
18 Henry E. Smith, Property Is Not Just a Bundle of Rights, 8 ECON J. WATCH 279, 286 (2011). 
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are supposed to accrue from different policies. It should be added that 
lawmaking in all areas tends to rely on incomplete information. Lawmakers 
typically have information about the costs of various measures, but the 
benefits can only be conjectured. Therefore, our study aims to put lawmaking 
in the property domain on equal footing with lawmaking in other domains. 
Finally, our study is uniquely important for U.S. policymakers because, 
in the United States, private property enjoys constitutional protection that 
does not exist in European countries. Under extant takings jurisprudence, 
formalization of a right to roam would likely amount to a taking of a public 
easement that requires compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.19 No such issue arose in England or Wales. Our study suggests 
what the expected compensation would be if a right to roam were recognized. 
Structurally, the remainder of the Article unfolds in four parts. In Part I, 
we discuss the place of the right to exclude in different traditions and schools 
of thought. In Part II, we explore the history and legal contours of the right 
to roam. In Part III, we lay out our empirical research design, discuss our 
results, and analyze the implications of our results to the debate about the 
centrality of the right to exclude. A short conclusion follows. 
I. THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AND ITS PLACE IN PROPERTY LAW 
Since antiquity, property law has been organized around three principal 
themes. The first was the res; property law was thought of as the legal field 
that deals with relationships between “person and thing.”20 The second theme 
was the in rem nature of property rights. Property rights were traditionally 
conceived as rights that avail against all other persons in the world.21 The 
third and final theme was exclusion.22 The concept of exclusion has come to 
define the essence of the relationship between rights-holders and the rest of 
the world.23 
In the following paragraphs, we discuss the evolution of the concept of 
property in scholarly writings and court decisions. Naturally, our main focus 
 
19 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding that the creation of 
a public right of access to a private pond constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment and cannot 
be carried out without the payment of just compensation). For further discussion, see infra Part III. 
20 See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1691 (2012) 
(providing a history of the laws of property as one between people and things being conceptualized). 
21 Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 358-59. 
22 See Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 862 (2014) (“Historically, in 
analyzing property, many jurists have emphasized the role of exclusion.”). 
23 See Jeremy Waldron, Property and Ownership (“‘Private property’ refers to a kind of system 
that allocates particular objects like pieces of land to particular individuals to use and manage as 
they please, to the exclusion of others (even others who have a greater need for the resources) and 
to the exclusion also of any detailed control by society.”), in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016). 
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is the right to exclude. However, we refer to the two other traditional 
characteristics of property law: its focus on things and the in rem nature of 
the protection it bestows. 
The right to exclude may be traced back to Roman law. Roman law did 
not develop a full-fledged definition of ownership.24 It was not concerned 
with enumerating the elements of ownership, let alone ranking them. Instead, 
it maintained a practical, rather than theoretical or conceptual, focus.25 As a 
result, the right to exclude was not explicitly recognized by Roman law.26 Yet, 
its existence was “an implicit assumption, part of the substructure of Roman 
Property law.”27 
It was during the Enlightenment era, however, that the right to exclude 
rose to prominence. Hugo Grotius, for example, deemed the right to exclude 
as the centerpiece of ownership, explaining that “‘ownership’ connotes 
possession of something peculiarly one’s own; that is to say, something 
belonging to a given party in such a way that it cannot be similarly possessed 
by any other party.”28 Samuel Pufendorf echoed the same sentiment when he 
wrote that dominion entailed the power “to dispose of things, which belong 
to us as our own, at our pleasure, and to keep all others from using them.”29 
While Pufendorf highlighted the owner’s abilities to dispose of her assets and 
use them as she pleases, both are undergirded by the owner’s right to exclude. 
For it is the right to exclude that prevents others from interfering with the 
owner’s use and power to transfer. 
The right to exclude reached its zenith in the work of the English jurist 
William Blackstone. Blackstone famously elevated the right to exclude above 
all other rights, powers, and privileges associated with private property—he 
treated exclusion as the very essence of property when he described the right 
of property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and 
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right 
of any other individual in the universe.”30 In this oft-cited statement, Blackstone 
 
24 See Peter Birks, The Roman Law Concept of Dominium and the Idea of Absolute Ownership, 1985 
ACTA JURIDICA 1, 3 (noting that Roman jurists took the phenomenon of property ownership for 
granted, and thus did not attempt to define it); see also ALAN RODGER, OWNERS AND 
NEIGHBOURS IN ROMAN LAW 1 (1972). 
25 See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 13 n.46 (2011) (noting that scholars of Roman law 
assumed that “Roman lawyers were more interested in the meaningful, real-world application of 
legal concepts and that they were generally reluctant to use definitions in civil law”). 
26 JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 307 (2014). 
27 Id. 
28 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE PRAEDAE COMMENTARIUS: COMMENTARY ON THE LAW 
OF PRIZE AND BOOTY 227 (Gwladys L. Williams & Walter H. Zeydel trans., Oxford Univ. Press 
1950) (1868). 
29 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, 2 DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO 533 (C.H. 
Oldfather et al. trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1672). 
30 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *2. 
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turned the right to exclude into the defining characteristic of private property. 
To be fair to Blackstone, it must be noted that many scholars believe that 
Blackstone himself did not endorse the extreme view that is so widely attributed 
to him.31 Yet, he became the flag bearer for the property as exclusion view. 
It is important to note that Blackstone was not alone in regarding 
exclusion as the essence of ownership. Even jurists, who did not adopt an 
absolutist view of exclusion, agreed about its centrality to ownership. For 
example, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, 
But what are the rights of ownership? They are substantially the same as those 
incident to possession. Within the limits prescribed by policy, the owner is 
allowed to exercise his natural powers over the subject-matter uninterfered 
with, and is more or less protected in excluding other people from such 
interference. The owner is allowed to exclude all, and is accountable to no 
one but him.32 
The opening salvo in the scholarly attack on the right to exclude came at 
the turn of the twentieth century with the writings of Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld. Interestingly, Hohfeld was not a specialized property scholar. Rather, 
he was a general theorist with a keen interest in legal concepts. As such, he 
sought to devise a comprehensive scheme of legal concepts. He maintained 
that all legal entitlements can be divided into four entitlements—claim rights, 
privileges, powers, and immunities—and their jural correlatives—duties, no-
rights, liabilities, and disabilities.33 
Hohfeld outright rejected the characterization of property as the law that 
governs relations between persons and things. According to Hohfeld, it made 
absolutely no sense to speak of rights against things.34 Property rights, like 
all other rights, were about relations among persons.35 
Furthermore, Hohfeld found no particular use for the classification of 
property rights as in rem rights. He viewed this classification as a mere 
 
31 Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601 (1998); see 
also David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 103, 
105 (2009) (suggesting that “the anointment of Blackstone as the symbol of property absolutism is 
more than a quirk of intellectual history—it is perverse”).  
32 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 193 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap 
Press 1963) (1881). 
33 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30 (1913) (laying out this theory of legal relations in opposition to the 
overly simplistic model of “rights” and “duties”). 
34 See id. at 23-24 (insisting that all legal interests are incorporeal and thus only applied 
amongst people). 
35 Id. 
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obfuscation that served no real purpose.36 He suggested that so-called in rem 
rights are actually no more, or less, than aggregations of in personam rights.37 
He further opined that only when in rem rights are broken down into their 
component in personam rights can the precise content of a right and its 
variation from one duty bearer to another be perceived.38 
Finally, Hohfeld maintained that it was impossible to reduce property 
relationships into a single exclusive feature—be it the right to exclude or any 
other right. In his view, a property right is a “complex aggregate of rights (or 
claims), privileges, powers, and immunities.”39 In Hohfeld’s view, ownership, 
or the fee simple right, bestowed upon its holder the right to exclude certain 
people from entering her land; an indefinite number of privileges to enter, 
use, and abuse her land; the power to transfer her interest to third parties; 
and multiple immunities that prevent others from appropriating her set of 
entitlements.40 Hohfeld further noted that “[b]ecause ownership is relational, 
no person can enjoy complete freedom to use, possess, enjoy, or transfer,” and 
thus, the real question becomes how much freedom should be given to owners 
and what level of interference they should be expected to endure.41 He also 
wished to emphasize the social and political aspects of court decisions relating 
to property.42 
Hohfeld’s conceptualization was seized upon by the legal realists, who 
recast it to produce the bundle of rights view of property.43 The legal realism 
movement that peaked in the first half of the twentieth century was 
predicated on the notion that law should not be studied as a self-contained 
discipline. The legal realists sought to explore the social effects of legal 
institutions and, in particular, the distribution of power and wealth generated 
by various legal arrangements.44 They were far less interested in the law in 
the books than in how the law operates on the ground. Accordingly, they 
 
36 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 
26 YALE L.J. 710, 720 (1917) (“[T]he expression ‘right in rem’ is all too frequently misconceived, and 
meanings attributed to it that could not fail to blur and befog legal thought and argument.”). 
37 See id. at 722-23 (“What is here insisted on—i.e., that all rights in rem are against persons,—is 
not to be regarded merely as a matter of taste or preference . . . . Logical consistency seems to 
demand such a conception, and nothing less than that.”). Hohfeld preferred to call in rem rights 
“multital” rights and in personam rights “paucital” rights. Id. at 723. 
38 See id. at 742-44 (arguing that distinct rights and their independence can be evicted by 
looking at property rights in this way). 
39 Id. at 746. 
40 Id. 
41 Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L. REV. 247, 251 (2007). 
42 Id. at 252. 
43 See generally Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); see also 
Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1159-60 (1938) (discussing the right of 
alienation as a power incident to property ownership). 
44 LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927–1960 3 (1986). 
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saw little value in legal concepts and abstractions.45 It is a bit paradoxical, 
therefore, that the legal realists drew their inspiration from Hohfeld, who was 
first and foremost a conceptualist. 
The legal realists have embraced the Hohfeldian framework and, in 
particular, the idea that property was a state-backed institution that governed 
relations among people.46 Furthermore, they set out to detail the effect of 
private property on third parties. In an influential article, Morris Cohen 
argued that private property is a form of sovereignty and that it is therefore 
“necessary to apply to the law of property all those considerations of social 
ethics and enlightened public policy which ought to be brought to the 
discussion of any just form of government.”47 Felix Cohen, another prominent 
figure in the realist movement,48 railed against the notion that private 
property is a private institution. He maintained that since private property 
affects the rest of our society, it must be viewed as a social institution. 
Furthermore, the state plays a key role in the recognition and enforcement of 
private property rights.49 Hence, private property cannot simply be justified 
by reference to the gains it produces for owners; rather, it is necessary to 
examine the effect of private property on nonowners as well as owners.50 
The realists further deemphasized the role of the right to exclude, putting 
it on par with other rights and capacities. To them, property was a bundle of 
rights or sticks. Or, simply put, property was an aggregation of entitlements 
that the law granted to property owners.51 There was no agreement among 
legal realists about the precise content of the rights in the bundle, nor did 
they converge on any specific enumeration. On the minimalist view, ownership 
 
45 See id. at 4-5 (noting that legal realists “focused on the interrelationship between law and society 
and refused to believe that legal concepts and rules were the sole determinants of judicial decisions”). 
46 The view of “property as social relations” is widely attributed to Morris Cohen. See Stephen 
R. Munzer, Property as Social Relations (discussing Morris Cohen’s contributions to legal realism in 
the law of property), in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 36, 
38 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). 
47 Cohen, supra note 43, at 14. 
48 On the contribution of Felix Cohen to legal realism, see Martin P. Golding, Realism and 
Functionalism in the Legal Thought of Felix S. Cohen, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1032, 1033 (1981), which 
notes that “Cohen’s work is of special interest to anyone attempting to come to grips with the realist 
movement,” and Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 470 n.6 (1988) 
(reviewing KALMAN, supra note 44), which describes Felix Cohen as a central figure in the legal 
realist movement. 
49 See Cohen, supra note 5, at 360 (characterizing property law as “an attempt upon the part of 
the state . . . to give a systematized recognition . . . of these attitudes and desires on the part of 
individuals towards things”). 
50 See id. at 362-63 (conceptualizing property as primarily relational). 
51 See, e.g., United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (“A common idiom describes 
property as a ‘bundle of sticks’—a collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, 
constitute property.”). 
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conferred the rights to possess, use, exclude, and transfer property.52 However, 
some scholars espoused a much broader view. Honoré, for example, listed as 
many as eleven incidents in his definition of ownership—the right to possess, 
the right to manage, the right to derive income, and several others.53 The 
bundle of rights conception was, therefore, more of a framework for thinking 
about the meaning of property than a precise definition of the term. 
More importantly, the bundle of rights conception offered an infinitely 
malleable view of property.54 It allowed for the abridgement and even 
abrogation of the various rights in the bundle without any detraction from 
the status of the bundle, or what remained of it, as property. The contours and 
the content of the bundle were blurry and shifting. Nonetheless, some of the 
leaders of the movement viewed the right to exclude as the only right that was 
indispensable to the definition of property. Morris Cohen, for one, believed that, 
at the end of the day, property boiled down to a government-enforced right to 
exclude others.55 Felix Cohen, too, echoed the same view when he concluded 
that “[p]rivate property . . . must at least involve a right to exclude others 
from doing something.”56 
The bundle of rights metaphor was adopted by the first Restatement of 
193657 and even influenced the Supreme Court. In its takings jurisprudence, 
the Supreme Court repeatedly used the bundle of rights conception of 
property.58 At the same time, however, the Supreme Court emphasized the 
importance of the right to exclude, calling it “one of the most essential sticks 
in the bundle.”59 More importantly, the Supreme Court granted special 
protection to private property owners against government incursions that 
 
52 This view was adopted by the Supreme Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982). 
53 A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 113 (A.G. Guest ed., 
1961). It is important to note that Honoré’s list also includes duties, such as the duty to prevent harm. 
54 See Anna di Robilant, Property: A Bundle of Sticks or a Tree?, 66 VAND. L. REV. 869, 886 
(2013) (“[A] fundamental intuition of the bundle of rights approach is that the bundle is malleable 
rather than having a prefixed and coherent structure or essence.”). 
55 See Cohen, supra note 43, at 12 (“The law does not guarantee me the physical or social ability 
of actually using what it calls mine . . . . [I]t may indirectly aid me by removing certain general 
hindrances to the enjoyment of property. But the law of property helps me directly only to exclude 
others from using the things which it assigns to me.”). 
56 Cohen, supra note 5, at 371. 
57 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY ch. 1, intro. note, § 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1936). 
58 See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
59 Id.; see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 (1994) (recognizing the fundamentalism 
of the right to exclude as characterized in Kaiser); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1044 
(1992) (referring to the right to exclude as “one of the most essential sticks” in the bundle of rights); 
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (same); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (“The power to exclude has traditionally been considered one 
of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”). 
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negate or compromise the right to exclude.60 The Supreme Court has 
consistently and steadfastly adhered to the view that permanent physical 
occupations of private property invariably amount to a compensable taking 
under the Fifth Amendment, even if the amount taken is vanishingly small. 
For example, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Supreme 
Court ruled that New York legislation that compelled private property owners 
to allow cable companies to install a small cable box on buildings’ roofs and 
run cables along the walls was an unconstitutional taking of property, since it 
compromised the buildings’ owners’ right to exclude.61 Similarly, in Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the imposition of a 
navigational servitude on private property could not be effected without 
compensation as that, too, infringed on the property owner’s right to exclude.62 
Over time, however, the bundle of rights view of property has begun to 
lose ground. In the last three decades, the scholarly pendulum has swung away 
from the bundle of rights conception and back toward the exclusion theory.63 
Scholars have argued that the bundle of rights theory led to the disintegration 
of property64 and that, effectively, it was not a theory at all.65 The 
dissatisfaction with the bundle of rights conceptualization revived theoretical 
interest in the right to exclude theory of property. 
Nearly two decades ago, James Penner mounted a frontal attack on the 
Hohfeldian edifice. In rejecting the bundle of rights theory, Penner wrote 
that property is not “some bundled together aggregate or complex of norms, 
but a single, coherent right”—the right to exclusive use.66 Penner’s theory 
puts the premium on exclusive use of assets67 and justifies the right to exclude 
as a means of securing this goal. He further argued that the correlative of the 
right to exclude is a single in rem duty, which applies to the rest of the world, 
 
60 See Elizabeth M. Glazer, Rule of (Out)law: Property’s Contingent Right to Exclude, 156 U. PA. 
L. REV. PENNUMBRA 331, 332 (2008) (“Despite Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld’s and A.M. Honoré’s 
efforts to bundle it with the rights to use, possess, and transfer property, the right to exclude has 
enjoyed an elevated status . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
61 458 U.S. at 419. 
62 444 U.S. at 179-80. 
63 See HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND 
RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY 164-65 (2013) (noting that “[a]fter decades in which the 
bundle-of-sticks picture . . . had been regarded as the conventional wisdom, several leading property 
scholars are again considering the right to exclude as the most defining feature of property”). 
64 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
65 See Smith, supra note 20, at 1700 (claiming that “[p]roperty as a bundle of sticks could be a 
partial outlook, but [it] is not a theory”). 
66 J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 754 (1996). 
67 See PENNER, supra note 10, at 71 (“[T]he right to property is a right to exclude others from 
things which is grounded by the interest we have in the use of things.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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to abstain from interfering with the property of others.68 It bears emphasis 
that Penner does not oppose the sharing of assets; on the contrary, he actually 
views it as a laudable social goal intrinsic to the idea of property.69 In his view, 
however, sharing should arise voluntarily and not be compelled by law.70 
In another influential article, Tom Merrill argued that the right to exclude 
is the sine qua non of property, stating, “Give someone the right to exclude 
others from a valued resource, i.e., a resource that is scarce relative to the 
human demand for it, and you give them property. Deny someone the 
exclusion right and they do not have property.”71 In Merrill’s view, all of the 
other rights and incidents that are associated with ownership, such as the right 
to possess, the right to use, and the power to transfer, emanate from the right 
to exclude.72 Exclusion, in other words, guarantees all of the other rights, 
powers, privileges, and immunities of property owners. It is, therefore, a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of property. 
The renaissance of the exclusionary view is due in major part to the work 
of Henry Smith. In an elaborate body of work, Henry Smith, alone and with 
Tom Merrill, has sought to resurrect the three constituent elements of the 
traditional view of property—i.e., that property is the law of things, that it is 
organized around the idea of in rem rights, and that the right to exclude is 
the keystone right. Notably, Merrill and Smith have advanced a unifying 
utilitarian theory that justifies all three elements: the information costs theory. 
The first step in doing so was to reinstate the in rem nature of property 
rights. Merrill and Smith have powerfully argued that the in rem nature of 
property rights is the key to understanding the field. As rights in rem that 
avail against the rest of the world, property rights oblige nonowners to inform 
themselves about their duties vis-à-vis property owners.73 This process is 
obviously costly, and the more complex, idiosyncratic, and undecipherable 
 
68 See Penner, supra note 66, at 807-08 (explaining that the duty is viable because individuals 
can recognize when property does not belong to them). 
69 See id. at 745 (“[T]he ability to share one’s things, or let others use them, is fundamental in 
the idea of property.”). 
70 See id. (describing how the reality of social interaction requires alienability to be voluntary). 
71 Merrill, supra note 9, at 730. 
72 See id. at 730-31 (describing the various rights associated with the right to exclude); see also 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Prism, 8 ECON J. WATCH 247, 249 (2011) (noting that “the 
essentialist thesis can be re-described as the claim that there must always be one stick in the bundle—
e.g., the right to exclude”). 
73 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (2000) (suggesting that the in rem nature of property 
rights means that third parties must determine the attributes of these rights in order to avoid violating 
them or to acquire them from the present holders); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What 
Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001) (explaining that the 
notification feature of property “imposes an informational burden on large numbers of people”). 
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property rights are, the higher the cost to third parties. Hence, in the context 
of property law, clarity and simplicity are of great importance. 
In keeping with this insight, Henry Smith has insisted that property is, after 
all, “the law of things.” For information cost reasons, it makes sense for property 
law to take advantage of the clear and well-defined boundaries of things, or 
assets, as a mechanism for communicating information to third parties as to their 
duties and liberties in their interactions with property owners.74 
Similarly, Smith views exclusion as a cost-effective way, or strategy,75 of 
conveying information to third parties. The exclusion right imposes on others a 
broad duty of forbearance that is clear and simple. Importantly, Smith does not 
consider exclusion a value, but rather “a rough first cut—and only that—at 
serving the purposes of property.”76 Merrill and Smith also argued that the legal 
duty to forebear from encroaching on others’ assets is consistent with our 
moral intuitions,77 which, in turn, further economizes on information costs. 
Therefore, from the perspective of information costs, it makes sense to construct 
property law around clearly defined assets and a broad duty to forebear.78 
Other utilitarian justifications of the right to exclude concentrate on the 
efficient use of assets. In his seminal article, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 
Demsetz famously wrote, “[A]n owner, by virtue of his power to exclude others, 
. . . [has] incentives to utilize resources more efficiently.”79 The assignment of 
a single owner with broad exclusionary powers, explained Demsetz, would 
ensure that the owner would bear the full marginal cost, as well as enjoy the full 
 
74 See Smith, supra note 20, at 1709-10 (describing the societal impact of in rem rights and the 
benefits associated with a simplified system). 
75 Smith repeatedly uses the term “exclusion strategy.” See Smith, supra note 18, at 281-82 
(describing the “exclusion strategy” as a means of “delegat[ing] to owners a choice of a range of uses” 
for resources by dividing the world into chunks and allowing each chunk’s owner to determine who 
can access it); see also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S468-69 (2002) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion Versus 
Governance] (discussing the use of the exclusion strategy to measure costs of a resource); Henry E. 
Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1745 
(2007) (stating that property relies on the exclusion strategy to protect “rights-holders’ interests in 
the use of resources indirectly, by using a simple signal for violations”). 
76 Smith, supra note 18, at 1705. 
77 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1849, 1853-58 (2007) (arguing that morality is a source of support for our system of in rem 
duties of abstention). 
78 See Smith, supra note 18, at 1693 (noting that “property defines things using an exclusion 
strategy of ‘keep off’ or ‘don’t touch’”). 
79 Demsetz, supra note 11, at 356. 
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marginal benefit, of her actions with respect to the resource.80 Hence, broad 
exclusion power creates optimal incentives to use assets efficiently.81 
Steven Shavell proffered a different efficiency-based justification for the 
right to exclude. Shavell astutely observed that in the absence of a right to 
exclude, possessors of assets would devote considerable resources to protect 
their possessions from predators. Such expenditures would be wasteful if the 
state, by enacting a right to exclude, protects rightful possessors more cost-
effectively.82 
There are also several non-utilitarian accounts that put the right to 
exclude at the heart of property law. The first non-utilitarian account dates 
back to Aristotle, who justified the right to exclude by reference to the 
concept of virtue.83 Aristotle argued that only against a background norm of 
exclusion can owners signal their virtue by waiving their right to exclude.84 
In other words, a baseline of exclusion enables a separating equilibrium in 
which virtuous owners distinguish themselves from the general pool by 
forsaking their right to exclude. 
Modern theorists justified the right to exclude on several other grounds. 
Jeremy Waldron, for example, justified the right to exclude by reference to 
the values of liberty and privacy. Waldron proposed that the right to exclude 
forms an important “realm of private freedom . . . where [one] can make 
decisions about what to do and how to do it, justifying these decisions if at 
all only to [one]self.”85 In a similar vein, Waldron argued that individuals 
“need a refuge from the general society of mankind[,] . . . a place where they 
 
80 See id. Some context is in order here. Demsetz compared two prototypical property regimes: 
communal property and private property. He noted that in communal property regimes, each co-owner 
can externalize costs onto other co-owners by increasing her consumption of the underlying resource, 
be it land, water, or any other tangible asset. Id. at 354-55. This problem is inimical to communal 
property regimes since they allow each user to enjoy the marginal benefit of her actions, while bearing 
only a small fraction of their marginal cost, with the remainder of the cost externalized to others. Id. 
City parks provide a helpful illustration. Visitors to a city park often use the park for their enjoyment 
but then leave and impose the cleanup costs on the entire population of the city. Demsetz demonstrated 
that the adoption of a private property regime with a single owner can alleviate this problem by 
concentrating all of the costs and all of the benefits in the hands of one person. Id. at 356-57. 
81 A notable exception is a case in which there are complementarities among different assets 
and transaction costs are high. We discuss this possibility below in Part II. 
82 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 20 (2004). For 
a contrary view, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Case for Imperfect Enforcement of 
Property Rights, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1927 (2012), which argues against state enforcement of private 
property rights. 
83 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 26-27 (Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988). 
84 See id. at 27, ll. 12-14 (“No one, when men have all things in common, will any longer set an 
example of liberality or do any liberal action; for liberality consists in the use which is made of 
property.”). 
85 JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 295 (1988). 
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can be assured of being alone . . . or assured of the conditions of intimacy 
with others.”86 
Finally, Shyamkrishna Balganesh has constructed a normative theory that 
bases the right to exclude in the principle of inviolability.87 The principle of 
inviolability “refers to the idea that certain entities (things and persons) are 
considered off-limits, by default to everyone.”88 According to Balganesh, it is 
well-established among anthropologists and sociologists that the idea of 
inviolability is embedded in all cultures and applies both to persons and 
things.89 As far as its applicability to things is concerned, “the norm of 
inviolability requires individuals to stay away from things unless, through 
some socially accepted practice (such as first possession, or consumption), 
they have a legitimate claim over them.”90 Balganesh emphasizes that the 
norm of inviolability is entrenched in social practice and that it provides the 
best explanation for the centrality of the right to exclude to property law.91 
In the last few years, however, a new challenge was leveled at the right to 
exclude owing to the emergence of the progressive property movement. In 
many important ways, the progressive property movement was born out of 
legal realism. Moreover, several key figures in the new movement were deeply 
influenced by the work of the legal realists.92 The progressive property 
movement is predicated on the idea that property, like all other legal 
institutions, should advance human flourishing. In keeping with this idea, 
notable progressive property scholars, such as Greg Alexander, Hanoch 
Dagan, Eduardo Peñalver, Joseph Singer, Laura Underkuffler, and Jedediah 
 
86 Id. at 296. 
87 See Balganesh, supra note 9 (arguing that the right to exclude follows from a universally 
recognized obligation not to interfere with others’ belongings). 
88 Id. at 620. 
89 See id. (“Sociologists and anthropologists have long argued that the [principle of inviolability] 
remains basic to all cultures, at all points in history, albeit to differing degrees and extents.”). 
90 Id. at 621. 
91 See id. at 622-25. 
92 See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement (citing 
Frank Michelman to support the proposition that “[t]he very legitimacy of a property system 
depends on the effect of conferring property rights on individuals and allowing those individuals to 
assert those rights against others”), in PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 3, 12 (Charles Geisler & Gail Daneker eds., 2000); Joseph William Singer, 
Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1291-92 (2014) [hereinafter Singer, Property as 
the Law of Democracy] (praising Henry Smith for “conceptualizing property . . . as a framework for 
‘interactions of persons in society’ as well as the foundation and infrastructure of private law”); see 
also HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS, at xvii (2011) (“This book offers 
an understanding of property as institutions, with its jurisprudential underpinnings grounded in 
legal realism . . . .”); Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1520 (2003) 
[hereinafter Dagan, The Craft of Property] (noting that legal realism underlies the conception of 
property as important default frameworks of interpersonal interactions). 
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Purdy,93 maintain that with property come not only rights but also 
obligations. Legislators and courts, in designing property policy, must be 
mindful of the needs not only of property owners, but of society at large. 
Property rights must give way to broader social needs and values. 
Furthermore, the progressive property movement has endorsed a 
pluralistic vision of property.94 On this vision, property is supposed to 
advance a wide range of values, ranging from “individual interests, wants, 
needs, desires, and preferences” to “social interests, such as environmental 
stewardship, civic responsibility, and aggregate wealth,” to general interests, 
such as “life and human flourishing, the protection of physical security, the 
ability to acquire knowledge and make choices, and the freedom to live one’s 
life on one’s own terms.”95 The movement’s statement explicitly admits that 
these values are incommensurable and therefore cannot be “analyzed through 
a single metric” or “[r]educe[d] . . . to one common currency.”96 
In light of the pluralistic vision of the movement, it is not surprising that 
progressive property scholars are also unified in their rejection of the right to 
exclude as the essence or core of property.97 The emergence of the progressive 
property movement has resurrected the bundle of rights conception of 
property and has put renewed pressure to scale back the right to exclude.98 
 
93 See JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY 135 (2010) (describing how modern 
property regimes developed as part of a social vision); Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach 
to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1258-65 (2005) (proposing 
a property system that embraces individual freedom); Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment 
and Reciprocity in the Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1110-16 (2007) 
(arguing that property law can and should promote human freedom by making negotiation, rather 
than domination, the way in which people recruit others into their projects). Unlike the others listed, 
Purdy does not claim to be a part of the progressive property movement despite his critique of 
exclusion essentialism. See Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 
1030-32 (2011) (understanding Purdy’s views within the context of pluralistic values in property law). 
94 See Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M. Peñalver, Joseph William Singer & Laura S. 
Underkuffler, supra note 13, at 743 (“Property implicates plural and incommensurable values.”).   
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 744. 
97 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1063, 
1064 (2009) (arguing that there is a “basic difficulty” in the idea that property “is exclusion, and 
everything else is a deviation from property”); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in 
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 801-04 (2009) (describing how beach access cases 
challenge the right to exclude conception of property); Dagan, The Craft of Property, supra note 92, 
at 1558-65 (proposing a “realist” view of property that runs contrary to the right to exclude 
conception); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 875-76 (2009) 
(promoting “virtue theory” as the ideal framework for addressing property law); Singer, Property as 
the Law of Democracy, supra note 92, at 1319-24 (noting that “owners have rights, but they also have 
obligations” in a discussion of whether an owner has a right to leave a vacant lot empty when it could 
be profitably developed). 
98 See Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101 CALIF. 
L. REV. 107, 145 (2013) (suggesting that the core ambition of the progressive property movement is 
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As one leading commentator astutely observed, this is not a coincidence.99 
The right to exclude lies at the heart of the debate between exclusion theorists 
and progressive property scholars because of the constitutional protection 
granted to private property under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.100 If courts accept the proposition that the right to exclude is 
the sine qua non of private property and grant it special protection, it would 
significantly undermine the ability of the state to advance the other goals of 
the progressive property movement. Any incursion on the right to exclude 
might require the government to pay just compensation to the affected 
property owners. Conversely, if courts accept the view that the right to 
exclude is merely another stick in the property bundle that may be removed 
without any special consequences, it would give the state the liberty to adopt 
policies that curb owners’ right to exclude with impunity.101 
And so, today, the world of property theorists is deeply divided over the 
centrality of the right to exclude to the definition of property.102 In the next Part, 
we will discuss the implications of the scholarly debate about the right to exclude 
in the context of the right to roam. We focus on the right to roam because it 
epitomizes many of the values endorsed by progressive property theorists and 
may even be justified from a purely utilitarian perspective. Furthermore, the 
right to roam, as presently adopted in several foreign legal systems, represents 
a relatively minimal incursion on property owners’ right to exclude. 
II. THE RIGHT TO ROAM 
Nowhere does the case of the progressive property movement seem more 
compelling than in the context of the right to roam. The right to roam 
empowers the general public to hike and engage in minimally intrusive 
recreational activities on qualifying private properties. Importantly for our 
purposes, it provides a unique opportunity to examine a concrete example that 
involves the theoretical disagreement between pro-access and pro-exclusion 
 
“to recognize more exceptions to the default rights of an owner to exclude, or put differently, to 
expand recognition of the public’s interest in privately held property”). 
99 See Merrill, supra note 72, at 248 (“The Realists and their modern heirs embraced the bundle 
because the idea of moving sticks in and out of bundles suggests the futility of giving significant 
constitutional protection to property.”). 
100 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”). 
101 See Merrill, supra note 72, at 248 (explaining how the bundle metaphor could be used to 
either encourage or discourage payment of compensation under the Takings Clause). 
102 See Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (2013) 
(observing that “[p]roperty theory today is alive with debate on core questions of entitlement 
design: whether property rules or liability rules should dominate, whether an exclusion- or thing-
based vision of property should trump the bundle-of-rights metaphor, whether fixed tenure menus 
aid or impede efficiency, and so on”). 
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scholars. Despite the strong rhetoric sometimes employed by scholars from 
both sides,103 the disagreement between the two camps is a matter of degree, 
not kind. Pro-access, or progressive property, scholars do not deny the 
importance of the right to exclude to property; rather, they argue that it must 
sometimes give way to other important values. Pro-exclusion scholars no 
longer maintain—and with the possible exception of Blackstone, never did 
maintain—that the right to exclude is absolute and, by and large, acknowledge 
the need to scale it back under appropriate circumstances.104 The right to 
roam provides us a test case through the study of which we can contextualize 
the grand debate that engulfed the property world.105 
Several characteristics make the right to roam an especially interesting 
opportunity for clarifying the differences in the views of pro-access scholars 
and pro-exclusion scholars. First, the right to roam implicates a relatively 
minimal intrusion on owners’ right to exclude. As we will show, the right to 
roam, as it was adopted in all countries in which it exists, does not deprive 
property owners of land and is carefully crafted to ensure that hikers do not 
interfere with owners’ possession or use rights. Second, there are prima facie 
efficiency and justice reasons to recognize the right to roam. It is often 
necessary to gain access to multiple parcels to complete a certain hike or trail. 
 
103 See Merrill, supra note 9, at 730 (“Give someone the right to exclude others from a valued 
resource . . . and you give them property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not have 
property.”); Penner, supra note 66, at 714 (“‘Property is a bundle of rights’ is little more than a 
slogan. . . . By ‘slogan’ I mean an expression that conjures up an image, but which does not represent 
any clear thesis or set of propositions. But like all good slogans, it rhetorically assuages the unease 
that results from our knowing there are real problems which, if plainly articulated, would demand 
serious consideration.”); Smith, supra note 20, at 1692 (“[T]he extreme realist picture . . . is myopic, 
inflexible, and ultimately unworkable . . . .”); see also Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American 
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 889, 890 (2009) (“The Social-Obligation Norm and Land Virtues 
may encourage lawyers and scholars to leap out of an economic frying pan into a political-philosophy 
fire.”); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 
815 (1935) (“The circularity of legal reasoning in the whole field of unfair competition is veiled by 
the ‘thingification’ of property.”); Adam Mossoff, The False Promise of the Right to Exclude, 8 ECON J. 
WATCH 255, 256 (2011) (“[L]awyers and economists should be wary of the theoretical promise of 
practical determinacy that is offered by the exclusion conception of property.”); Singer, supra note 
92, at 1299 (“Information costs help us manage in the world, but they are neither the only thing we 
care about nor the most important.”). For a neat overview of the different theoretical positions in 
this grand debate, see John A. Lovett, Progressive Property in Action: The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 
2003, 89 NEB. L. REV. 739, 743 (2011), which calls 2000–2009 the decade of “the noughties” and 
characterizes the scholarly discussion of property law as “an on-going, high level debate between two 
rival camps of property theorists about the fundamental structure and values of property law in 
general and over the nature and importance of the right to exclude in particular.” 
104 See Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 75, at S454 (noting that rights “fall on a 
spectrum between the poles of exclusion and governance”). 
105 See Lovett, supra note 103, at 740 (“For more than a decade two rival camps of property 
theorists have made powerful, often intricate, and seemingly irreconcilable claims about the function 
and normative value of exclusion rules in property law.”). 
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Hence, if members of the public were to try to obtain the right through 
voluntary market transactions, they would invariably run into the twin 
problems of high transaction costs and strategic holdouts (owners who would 
deny them permission in order to extract as much of a bargaining surplus as 
possible). These twin problems are well-known from the takings literature on 
eminent domain and, in fact, constitute the standard justification for 
recognizing the power of eminent domain in the government. The right to 
roam is also appealing on distributive justice grounds as it benefits the public 
at large at the expense of potentially affluent property owners by making the 
latter’s lots subject to roaming rights. Third, and perhaps most important, the 
right to roam was enacted, among other places, in England, Wales, and 
Scotland, common law countries whose property history and roots are similar 
to those of the United States.106 
In the remainder of this Part, we discuss the significance of the right to 
roam to property theory and elaborate on the efficiency and justice reasons 
that may be marshaled in support of its adoption. We then outline the legal 
characteristics of the right to roam as it was enacted in various countries. 
Because our empirical analysis is based on data from England and Wales, we 
focus on the legal attributes of the right to roam in these two countries. 
A. Theory 
From a theoretical perspective, the right to roam provides a powerful 
demonstration of the possibilities embedded in a use-based model of 
property, namely a model that seeks to maximize aggregate use of assets 
independently of their boundaries. For this reason and others, it has attracted 
the attention of progressive property scholars. Progressive property scholars 
have used the right to roam as a prime example of how the vision and ideals 
of their movement can work in practice. For example, John Lovett described 
the enactment of the right to roam in Scotland as “[p]rogressive [p]roperty 
in [a]ction”107 and proposed that it can serve as a blueprint for legal reforms 
in the United States.108 At the same time, the recognition of roaming rights 
invariably necessitates imposing limitations on certain owners’ right to 
exclude. Therefore, the right to roam embodies an inevitable tradeoff between 
exclusion and access. 
 
106 See id. at 742 (“[T]he [Land Reform (Scotland) Act] actually replaces the traditionally 
robust, modular, ex ante presumption in favor of the right to exclude with a surprisingly simple, but 
also robust, ex ante presumption in favor of responsible access.” (emphasis omitted)). 
107 See generally id. 
108 See id. at 742 (arguing that the Land Reform (Scotland) Act “shows us something important 
about what is possible in property law design”). 
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As important, one can make a prima facie case for adopting a right to 
roam on both efficiency and distributive justice grounds. Consider the 
efficiency justification first. Although there is broad consensus among 
economists and law and economics scholars about the importance of the right 
to exclude in incentivizing owners to make optimal decisions with respect to 
their own assets, there is also universal recognition that strong exclusion 
powers can thwart socially desirable enterprises involving multiple parcels of 
land. To see this, assume that an entrepreneur (be it the government or a 
private actor) wishes to construct a new highway or lay tracks for a high speed 
railroad. Under all legal systems that respect property owners’ right to 
exclude, the execution of the project would require the entrepreneur to secure 
consent from all relevant owners. Yet, in many cases, doing so might prove 
prohibitive. First, the need to engage multiple rights-holders in negotiations 
requires expenditure of significant resources, and the cost rises as the number 
of rights-holders increases. Second, each rights-holder has an incentive to 
hold out in the hope of extracting the lion’s share of the contractual surplus 
from the entrepreneur. Since the last remaining owner has the most leverage 
in negotiating with the entrepreneur, as the fate of the project hinges on her 
consent, all owners are likely to refuse to tender early.109 The need to 
overcome the problems of high transaction costs and strategic holdouts is the 
standard justification for government intervention in land use planning, in 
general, and the government’s ability to condemn private property by 
eminent domain, in particular.110 
Furthermore, Michael Heller, both alone and with Rebecca Eisenberg, has 
shown that the dispersion of veto rights among multiple rights-holders often 
leads to underutilization of assets.111 It can also block the development of 
projects that involve complementarities among different assets.112 Roaming 
 
109 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-07 (1972) (discussing this 
holdout problem in the context of property rule legal systems). 
110 See id. (arguing that eminent domain solves the holdout problem by using government 
power to set an objectively reasonable transaction price); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 22 (1972) (noting that one purpose of eminent domain is to prevent holdouts 
from obtaining monopolies); Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 529-31 (2009) 
(arguing that eminent domain “provides the solution to the strategic difficulties raised by . . . 
holdout[s]”); Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to 
Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 572 (1993) (characterizing the government’s power of eminent 
domain as “typically to prevent holdouts”). 
111 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx 
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 677 (1998) (noting that a “tragedy of the anticommons can occur 
when too many individuals have rights of exclusion in a scarce resource” (emphasis omitted)). 
112 See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY 1 (2008) (addressing this problem in 
the broader corporate context); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
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rights are a case in point. Hiking trails, very much like roads, typically span 
across multiple parcels. Moreover, there are obvious complementarities 
among the different parcels over which a trail passes, which are best evidenced 
by beach access cases.113 The omission of a few lots—and in some cases, even 
a single lot—from a trail may critically undermine its utility to the public. 
Further, outdoor activities are characterized by a high degree of spontaneity. 
Hence, the higher the degree of freedom the public enjoys, the more the 
public values the right to roam. Consequently, it is impractical to expect that 
roaming rights will arise voluntarily via private transactions between 
landowners and hikers. In light of the high number of parties involved (both 
hikers and landowners) and their wide range of preferences, attempts to 
devise roaming rights privately are likely to collapse under the weight of 
transaction costs. For all of these reasons, an elaborate scheme of roaming 
rights can generally only be established by the government. 
The right to roam may also be justified on distributive justice grounds. 
The formalization of a right to roam works to transfer wealth from individual 
property owners to the public at large. To the extent that property ownership 
is concentrated among those with higher than average wealth and that hikers 
will tend to be of average wealth as they come from all corners of our society, 
the recognition of a public right of access benefits the average citizen at the 
expense of those who are generally better off. The Scottish experience 
provides a vivid illustration of this effect. By some estimates, in 1995, 57.8% 
of the land of Scotland was owned by only 1411 owners.114 Furthermore, many 
of the largest estates in Scotland belong to absentee owners from other 
countries, who visit their vast properties only periodically.115 
Some property scholars argue that the right to roam is especially 
appealing from a distributive perspective. In defending courts’ decisions to 
grant public access to private beaches,116 Greg Alexander writes that public 
access to beaches is “a valuable form of recreation” and that “[r]ecreation is 
not a luxury but a necessity . . . [,] an important aspect of the capabilities of 
 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998) (demonstrating 
this problem in the context of scientific research). 
113 See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1987) (addressing state 
regulations on a proposed house on beachfront property that would block the public’s view of the 
coastline). 
114 ANDY WIGHTMAN, WHO OWNS SCOTLAND 142-43, 158 tbl.3 (1996). 
115 See Lovett, supra note 103, at 772 (noting “[t]he increasingly frequent phenomena of 
absentee ownership” in Scotland). 
116 See, e.g., Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 124 (N.J. 2005) 
(holding that a portion of a beach club’s sands had to be available for public use and travel); 
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 368-69 (N.J. 1984) (holding that allowing 
membership in a beach association supported public beach access). 
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both life and sociability.”117 He proceeds to explain that there is “growing 
medical evidence indicating that recreation and relaxation contribute 
importantly to good health”118 and laments the fact that “some of the very 
groups who need recreation the most often do not, as a practical matter, have 
access to it.”119 As for sociability, Alexander postulates that “[a]s a good, 
sociability encompasses subsidiary goods such as friendship and social 
participation”—both of which are enhanced by public access to beaches.120 Of 
course, Alexander’s arguments apply with equal force to access to other open 
spaces and natural amenities, highlighting the powerful distributional case for 
adopting a broad right to roam. 
B. Law 
The debate about the right to roam is not merely theoretical. Several 
European countries, including some that come from the same property 
tradition as the United States, recognize the right to roam. The European 
experience with the right to roam can be viewed as a natural experiment from 
which American scholars and policymakers alike can draw important lessons 
as to the optimal design of the right to roam and the best way to implement 
it. In the following paragraphs, we provide a comparative review of the right 
to roam as it exists in various European countries. We put special emphasis 
on the design of the right to roam in England and Wales as we use data from 
these countries to examine the effect of the right on property values in Part III. 
In feudal times, English commoners enjoyed a plethora of access and use 
rights to lands that were held by feudal lords. These rights were largely 
extinguished by the enclosure movement in the seventeenth and especially 
eighteenth centuries via private agreements and legislation.121 As a consequence, 
the English land system moved from a pragmatic model with multiple rights-
holders in every lot to a model of exclusive ownership.122 At the turn of the 
twentieth century, the general public in England had no access rights to 
private property, except in those cases where permission was secured from 
the relevant owner or granted specifically by statute.123 
 
117 Gregory S. Alexander, Ownership and Obligations: The Human Flourishing Theory of Property, 
43 H.K.L.J. 451, 460 (2013). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 461. 
121 See Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359, S366 
(2002) (describing enclosure as a “massive reorganization of property rights”). 
122 See id. 
123 See ANGELA SYDENHAM, PUBLIC RIGHTS OF WAY AND ACCESS TO LAND 196-97 (4th 
ed. 2010) (discussing punishments for obstruction of highways and including gates, fences, and wires 
as forms of obstruction); Jerry L. Anderson, Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s Bundle 
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The first harbinger of change was the Law of Property Act of 1925, which 
recognized a public right of access to common land in certain urban areas in 
England and South Wales for purposes of “air and exercise.”124 The next 
statutory intervention came after World War II, when the Parliament enacted 
the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 (NPACA). The 
Act promoted open access in two principal ways. First, it encouraged landlords 
to enter agreements that granted the public access rights over private lands with 
local authorities.125 Second, it instructed local authorities to survey and map all 
public rights of way in order to inform the public of its rights.126 
The most important and comprehensive reform came half a century later 
with the passage of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000.127 The Act 
granted the general public in England and Wales a right of access to most 
“open” areas in England and Wales.128 The legislation of the Act was followed 
by an extensive effort to define and map the areas to which the right applied. 
The mapping process was completed on October 31, 2005, at a cost of £69 
million to the British public.129 The legislative scheme in England and Wales 
recognizes a right to roam that applies to three main categories of land:130 
(1) mapped open country; (2) mountain land; and (3) coastal land.131 
The first category of mapped open country covers designated areas as they 
appear on a conclusive map issued by the “appropriate countryside body” as 
“open country.”132 “Open country,” in turn, is defined as land that “(a) appears 
to the appropriate countryside body to consist wholly or predominantly of 
 
of Sticks, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 394 (2007) (“In the end, the right to roam the 
countryside was not recognized as important enough to justify a common law right. As a result lands 
that for centuries had been open to the public for wandering were shut off by the landowner . . . .”). 
124 Law of Property Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5 c. 20, § 193 (Eng. & Wales). 
125 Lovett, supra note 103, at 769. 
126 Id. 
127 Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, c. 37 (Eng. & Wales). The formalization of a 
similar right in Scotland in 2003 gave walkers access to almost all land as long as they behaved 
responsibly. See Lovett, supra note 103, at 777-78 (contrasting the Scottish legislation with the British 
statute); What Is the Right to Roam?, RAMBLERS ASS’N, http://www.ramblers.org.uk/advice/paths-
and-access/england/what-is-the-right-to-roam.aspx [https://perma.cc/F4UV-XZCS] (providing a 
summary of right to roam laws in Scotland, England, and Wales). 
128 Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, c. 37, § 2 (Eng. & Wales). 
129 SELECT COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS, THIRTY-SECOND REPORT: THE RIGHT 
OF ACCESS TO OPEN COUNTRYSIDE, 2006-7, HC 91, ¶ 11 (UK). 
130 There are also two much smaller categories to which the right applies: “registered common 
land”—i.e., land that was specifically designated as such by the Commons Registration Act 1965—and 
“dedicated land”—i.e., land that was dedicated to the public by private owners as access land. Lovett, 
supra note 103, at 781. 
131 The Act also gave power to the Secretary of State for England and the National Assembly for 
Wales to extend the right to coastal areas, conditioned on parliamentary approval. Acting on this power, 
Parliament enacted the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, c. 23, §§ 296, 303 (Eng. & Wales). 
132 Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, c. 37, § 1(1)(a) (Eng. & Wales). 
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mountain, moor, heath or down, and (b) is not registered common land.”133 
The statutory definition excludes areas that were determined by the 
appropriate countryside body to be “improved or semi-improved grassland.”134 
The second category, mountain land, refers to mountains of 1968 feet (600 
meters) or higher.135 The third category, “coastal land,” was added in 2009 
with the enactment of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 and extended 
the right to roam to a “coastal margin”136 in order to form a trail of over 2700 
miles along the English coast.137 Overall, the public right of access covers 3.4 
million acres (between 8% and 12% of the total amount of land) in some of 
the best hiking areas in England and Wales.138 
The right to roam is subject to several limitations. First, the right does 
not apply to freshwater bodies such as rivers, streams, and lakes. Second, it 
excludes cultivated agricultural areas.139 Third, the Act specifically exempts 
sports fields, such as golf courses, race courses, and aerodromes.140 Fourth, 
the Act provides that the right does not extend to land “within 20 metres [(60 
feet)] of a dwelling,” as well as parks and gardens, thereby creating a “privacy 
zone” for landowners in the ground adjacent to their homes.141 Fifth, the right 
to roam in England and Wales permits only access on foot for recreational 
purposes.142 Other recreational activities such as cycling, horseback riding, 
camping, hunting, boating, bathing, or even lighting campfires are forbidden.143 
In addition, hikers are required to avoid causing property damage and to 
respect walls, gates, and fences.144 They are also expected to protect plants 
and animals.145 
 
133 Id. § 1(2). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, c. 23, §§ 296, 303 (Eng. & Wales). The process by 
which the exact location of the coastal margin is to be determined is expected to take years. For this 
reason, we could not include it in our study. 
137 See KATY OXFORD, NAT’L ASSEMBLY FOR WALES RESEARCH SERV., COUNTRYSIDE 
ACCESS IN THE UK: A REVIEW OF ASSOCIATED LEGISLATION AND POLICY § 3.3.5 (2014) 
(describing the England Coast Path as “the longest of the National Trails in England at 4,400 km”). 
138 See The Ramblers Ass’n, The “Right to Roam” in England and Wales 1 (2007), 
http://www.ramblers.org.uk/~/media/Files/Go%20walking/AccessFactSheet-FS8 [https://perma.cc
/KA2S-9HPB] (describing the 3.4 million acres to which the law applies as “some of England’s best 
walking areas”). 
139 Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, c. 37, sch. 1, pt. 1, para. 1 (Eng. & Wales). 
140 Id. at sch. 1, pt. 1, para. 7. 
141 Id. at sch. 1, pt. 1, paras. 3–4. 
142 See id. at sch. 2, para. 1(a) (providing that the Act does not entitle a person to be on land if 
he is driving or riding a vehicle). 
143 See id. at sch. 2, para. 1. 
144 See id. 
145 Id. at sch. 2, paras. 1(f), 1(l). 
2017] The Value of the Right to Exclude 943 
Landowners, for their part, are obliged to give the public free access to 
their properties if they are subject to the right to roam. In keeping with this 
obligation, owners must ensure that all rights of way on their properties are 
clear and must not post or maintain any misleading notices on, near, or on 
the way to access land.146 Private landowners may restrict or bar access 
altogether for up to twenty-eight days a year for any reason.147 However, any 
restriction in excess of that period must be justified and requires special 
approval from the authorities, which may be granted for reasons of land 
management, conservation, or fire prevention.148 
Under the Act, landowners are exempt from tort liability for harm to 
hikers caused by natural features of the property or resulting from an 
improper use of gates, fences, or walls.149 However, landowners are liable for 
harms resulting from the materialization of risks they have intentionally or 
recklessly created.150 For example, if an owner releases her cattle to graze on 
the property and one cow attacks a visitor, the owner would be held liable for 
the injury sustained by the visitor. 
It may surprise American readers, but the scope of the right to roam in 
England and Wales is modest relative to the scope of the right in other 
countries. In Scotland, the right to roam, as established by the Land Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2003 (LRSA), covers almost the entire territory of the country.151 
Furthermore, Scottish law contains fewer exclusions and exemptions. For 
example, in Scotland, the right to roam also applies to grassy sports fields 
when they are not in active use.152 More significantly, the range of activities 
permitted under Scottish law is much broader than the range permitted in 
England and Wales. The definition of the right to roam in Scotland 
encompasses such activities as organized educational tours,153 orienteering, 
bicycle riding, rock climbing, swimming, and camping.154 Finally, Scottish law 
does not demarcate a clear “privacy zone” for landowners (as the English law 
does). Instead, it employs a reasonableness standard, requiring hikers to 
provide owners with a reasonable measure of privacy and refrain from 
 
146 Id. § 14(1). 
147 Id. § 22(1)–(4). 
148 Id. §§ 24–26. 
149 Id. § 13(2). 
150 Id. 
151 See Lovett, supra note 103, at 777-78 (comparing LRSA coverage of “almost all land and in-land 
water in Scotland” to the small percentage of English land covered by Countryside and Rights of 
Way Act). 
152 Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, (ASP 2) § 7(7)(a)–(b). 
153 See id. § 1(3)(b) (specifying that the access rights created by the Act may be exercised for 
the purposes of carrying on a “relevant educational activity”). 
154 See Lovett, supra note 103, at 787 (describing the extensive activities permitted under the LRSA). 
944 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 917 
unreasonably disturbing them.155 This means that in Scotland, private 
landowners can exclude visitors only to the extent necessary to give them a 
reasonable degree of privacy in their homes. The conscious decision by the 
Scottish legislature to avoid bright-line rules in designing the right to roam 
and to build the statutory scheme on the standard of “reasonable access” 
created uncertainty as to the precise scope of the right and has necessitated 
judicial intervention in some cases.156 
Some Scandinavian countries went even further than Scotland in 
recognizing public roaming rights. In Scandinavia, the right to roam has 
ancient historic roots and is widely known as “everyman’s right.”157 In Norway, 
for example, the right to roam encompasses recreational activities such as 
swimming, sailing, canoeing, and rowing.158 Hikers are allowed, in principle, 
to pick up berries, flowers, and mushrooms for in situ consumption.159 
Moreover, the right to roam grants the public the right to pitch tents and 
camp for up to two days without seeking permission from the owner, as long 
as tents are positioned at least 500 feet away from the nearest house and the 
privacy of landowners is respected.160 Campers are allowed to light campfires 
between mid-April and mid-September.161 As far as their duties are 
concerned, in residential areas, hikers must keep a distance of 500 feet from 
houses and other structures.162 Visitors must also refrain from littering, 
causing property damage, and disturbing farm animals and wildlife.163 
Moreover, the right to roam does not cover freshwater fishing.164 
The success of the right to roam in Europe has prompted calls to 
implement a similar arrangement in the United States. However, no one, so 
far, has paused to ask the important question: what would be the effect of 
doing so on property values? In the next Part, we set out to fill this void, in 
 
155 Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, (ASP 2) § 6(1)(b)(iv). 
156 See Lovett, supra note 103, at 790 (noting that it is “not surprising” that the courts were left 
to “draw . . . boundaries that the Scottish Parliament declined to draw”). 
157 See, e.g., Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 
298-99 (2008) (discussing the Scandinavian principle of Allemansratt); Barbro Plogander, 
Modernizing Everyman’s Right to Roam in Sweden, EPOCH TIMES (Aug. 9, 2012), http://printarchive.
epochtimes.com/a1/en/us/nyc/2012/08-Aug/09/A04_EET20120809-NY-US.pdf [https://perma.cc/3
X4M-PM2Z] (describing the Swedish “everyman’s right” as the “right to public access to the 
wilderness [that] dates back centuries”); see also Freedom to Roam, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Freedom_to_roam#In_the_Nordic_countries [https://perma.cc/RYA9-TGMP] (last updated 
Feb. 4, 2017). 
158 NORWEGIAN ENV’T AGENCY, M-86, RIGHT TO ROAM 2 (2013). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 6. 
161 Id. at 3. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at 3, 14. 
164 Id. at 10. 
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the hope of introducing an empirical dimension into the scholarly debates 
about the right to roam and the right to exclude. 
III. THE EFFECT OF THE RIGHT TO ROAM ON HOUSING PRICES 
Laws serve as amenities that affect the enjoyment of one’s property. As 
such, it is possible to estimate the value that individuals place on a law by 
examining how property prices change when a law is passed. This approach 
to estimating the value of a law is advocated by Anup Malani, who suggests 
that changes in real estate value provide a relatively direct proxy for 
individual utility (which is, of course, not directly measurable).165 
In the context of the right to roam, property owners and interested buyers 
implicitly calculate the net effect of increased access to natural features 
provided by the right plus any loss they expect to incur from having to let 
others cross their land. If buyers and owners believe the value of increased 
access outweighs the lost value arising from the abridgement of their 
exclusion right, real estate prices will increase, all other things being equal. 
If, instead, the loss exceeds the gain, real estate prices will decline (again, all 
other things being equal). 
A. Research Design 
To examine these hypotheses econometrically, it is necessary to examine 
the change in property values after the right to roam law is passed relative to 
the preexisting baseline. This before/after element of the research design 
accounts for any constant underlying heterogeneity in property values that 
may otherwise obscure the effect of any law change. For example, it is perhaps 
the case that properties near hiking trails are generally more valuable than 
those that lie far from such trails. If the right to roam law affects such lands 
disproportionately, and this preexisting premium is not accounted for, it may 
appear as though the right to roam law is associated with higher property 
values when, in fact, it is hiking trails that create the price premium. 
Likewise, it is important to be able to compare the values of properties 
that are differentially exposed to the right to roam law (e.g., compare 
properties where the law is in effect with properties in a jurisdiction where 
the law is not in effect). This treatment/control element of the research design 
is meant to account for any background trend in home values that is unrelated 
to the passage of the law. Failure to account for this would have the potential 
to confound the effect of the law with other changes in property values. For 
 
165 See generally Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1273 (2008) 
(proposing a method for evaluating laws based on the extent to which they raise housing prices or 
the value of residential land). 
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example, if property values are going up over time everywhere (and, to cause 
maximum econometric heartache, are doing so in a way that is not easily 
captured by a simple trend variable), it might appear as though the right to 
roam law is associated with an increase in property values when, actually, the 
values would have risen even in the absence of the passage of the law. 
Including the control group observations (for which the law change is not 
occurring) allows the researcher to net out these comparable background 
trends, as long as treatment and control groups are trending in a parallel 
fashion. In principle, such a design will allow us to isolate the effect of the 
passage of the right to roam law on real estate prices independent of any 
preexisting heterogeneity in housing prices and any background trends. 
In practice, however, things can go awry. First, there is often no data 
spanning the before and after periods. For example, although we would like 
to study the effects of Scotland’s more comprehensive right to roam statute, 
the public real estate price data for Scotland are extremely limited prior to 
the law’s adoption in 2003. Second, for the control observations to adequately 
control for background trends, the control group must actually provide a 
reasonable counterfactual trend for the treatment observations. If it does not, 
its inclusion could fail to prevent a background trend from confounding the 
estimation of the law’s effect, and it could actually make the estimate even 
worse than if no control group had been used at all.166 
Given these complications, we take the following approach. First, we 
focus on property values in England and Wales since both countries have 
comprehensive real estate price data for the 1995–2014 period, which spans 
the law change that took place in 2000 for those countries. Second, rather 
than compare the prices in these countries to prices in some other country 
where no right to roam law was passed during the period, we instead compare 
properties within the countries by region, exploiting the fact that some 
regions of each country have a relatively large fraction of land that is affected 
by the law, while other regions are largely unaffected by the law because they 
lack the natural features specified in the law. By examining this comparison 
between regions of one country, as opposed to looking at the differences 
across countries, we ensure that any other changes occurring at the national 
level (e.g., other law changes, macroeconomic effects, banking or creditor 
policy changes, etc.) that may lead to different background trends in real 
estate prices are adequately accounted for. 
 
 
 
166 For a more in-depth discussion of these issues, see Jonah B. Gelbach & Jonathan Klick, 
Empirical Law and Economics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Francesco 
Parisi ed., forthcoming 2017), especially section III.B. 
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Our difference-in-difference estimation strategy takes the following form 
where the outcome variable (prt) is the average sales price167 sold in the region 
r for the given time period (month t). We examine the natural log of the 
average sales price.168 The data are available for each month from 1995 to 2014, 
so we have 240 observations for each region in our dataset. The treatment 
variable takes the value of zero for every period prior to December 2000, 
when the law passed. In subsequent periods, the value is the fraction of total 
land area in the region that is ultimately designated as access land.169 The 
regression includes separate fixed effects for each region of the country being 
studied170 (which allows for different baseline prices across the country), as 
well as separate time fixed effects for each period171 (which allows for a 
common background trend that could potentially be nonlinear) included in 
the dataset. In some specifications, we account for the possibility that 
different regions have differential preexisting trends by including a set of 
terms where the region’s fixed effects are interacted with a linear time trend.172 
This allows us to detrend the data differentially by region while running the 
regression above. 
 
167 The results that follow are largely unaffected if we instead focus on the price index available 
in the dataset, which is based on properties that have been sold multiple times in the dataset to 
account for changes such as size and style, etc., in the type of house. See GOV.UK, ABOUT THE UK 
HOUSE PRICE INDEX (2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/about-the-uk-house-
price-index/about-the-uk-house-price-index [https://perma.cc/Y3AK-SYJC] (discussing how matched 
pairs of transactions are used in a repeat sales regression procedure to develop the index so that 
price trajectories can be estimated independently of any change in the housing mix that generates 
the sales for a given month). 
168 Focusing on the natural logarithm is helpful because it allows us to interpret the coefficients 
as percentage changes. See JAMES H. STOCK & MARK W. WATSON, INTRODUCTION TO 
ECONOMETRICS 271 (2d ed. 2007). 
169 More explicitly, our treatment variable is the interaction between landfractionr, which is 
always equal to the fraction of land designated as access land in the particular region (i.e., it does 
not differ period to period), and lawt, which is the same for every region, but differs across the time 
periods (i.e., it is 0 for periods prior to December 2000, and it is equal to 1 for periods from 
December 2000 through the end of the sample period). 
170 This is represented in the equation by the summation of ηr terms. Effectively, this allows 
for each region to have its own differential baseline or intercept term in the regression. This regional 
baseline is constant throughout the sample timespan. 
171 This is represented in the equation by the summation of τt terms. This allows each period 
to have its own differential baseline or intercept term in the regression. This time period baseline is 
constant across all regions for the given time period. 
172 Mechanically, this involves adding a separate additional variable to the regression for each 
region where the variable is equal to a linear count (i.e., 1, 2, 3, . . . , T) for the given region, and 
adding zero for the other regions. 
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To further limit the possibility that other background factors are driving 
real estate prices during our sample period, in addition to examining the 
entire period 1995–2014, we also separately analyze substantially shorter time 
windows to provide confidence that any price change we observe after the law 
was passed is, in fact, due to the passage of the right to roam law and not 
other things that may be changing in England and Wales. Focusing on short 
time windows has the advantage of narrowing the possibility that other 
changes relevant to real estate prices are occurring after the enactment of the 
right to roam law. However, it also requires that owners and potential buyers 
capitalize their views regarding the right to roam quickly. If it takes too much 
time for the process to occur, short windows might miss some (or all) of the 
resulting price evolution. Additionally, the expectations of what costs and 
benefits the right to roam will bring may depart substantially from what 
owners and potential buyers ultimately experience once the law is in effect. 
For these reasons, we examine a number of different time periods, including 
both short and long windows around the statute’s passage in 2000. 
We focus on the passage of the law in 2000, rather than its subsequent 
implementation, for two reasons. First, presumably, if owners and potential 
buyers are rational, they will incorporate their expectations about the law 
when it becomes clear that it will come into effect. Waiting until the law is 
actually implemented to revise price expectations presumably creates arbitrage 
opportunities for other actors in the market. Second, econometrically, since the 
actual access land designations were made well after 2000, focusing on the 
passage date helps mitigate a potential endogeneity problem. That is, if public 
officials ultimately end up making access land designations on the basis of 
expected changes in real estate values, it would be the case that our treatment 
metric is actually influenced by our outcome variable, leading to a reverse 
causation problem. Such determinations could either occur directly, with public 
officials favoring higher/lower value areas for common access designation, or 
they could occur indirectly, with higher/lower (though likely higher) value land 
owners lobbying officials more vigorously during the designation period. By 
focusing on price changes as of 2000, when the actual ultimate determinations 
are unknown and actors in the real estate market are only basing their 
expectations on the (pre)existence of the natural features designated in the 
statute, this kind of reverse causality problem is less likely to influence our results. 
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B. Data 
The real estate data come from the United Kingdom’s Land Registry 
House Price Index webpage.173 These data include all residential housing 
transactions in England and Wales, whether done by cash or with the use of 
a mortgage.174 The relevant geographic units in England are regions, while in 
Wales, they are counties and authorities. This difference was necessitated by 
the geographic units for which the access land measurements were available. 
Thus, for England, we have average house sales price data by month for the 
following nine regions: North East, North West, York and Humberside, West 
Midlands, East Midlands, East of England, London, South West, and South 
East. For Wales, we have monthly average house sales price data for the 
following twenty-two counties and authorities: Blaenau Gwent, Bridgend, 
Caerphilly, Cardiff, Carmarthenshire, Ceredigion, Conwy, Denbighshire, 
Flintshire, Gwynedd, Isle of Anglesey, Merthyr Tydfil, Monmouthshire, 
Neath Port Talbot, Newport, Pembrokeshire, Powys, Rhondda Cynon Taff, 
Swansea, The Vale of Glamorgan, Torfaen, and Wrexham. 
The fraction of land covered by the law is measured as the total land area 
affected divided by the total land area in the geographic unit. For England, 
the data were provided to us by the Open Access Contact Centre at Natural 
England. These data are reproduced in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Access Land in England 
 
Region Total Area (ha) Access Land (ha) Percent 
London 159,471.80 831 0.5 
East of England 1,957,409.90 14,463.20 0.7 
West Midlands 1,300,380.50 18,852.40 1.4 
East Midlands 1,581,076.00 33,182.40 2.1 
South East 1,940,740.50 49,599.00 2.6 
South West 2,436,589.10 108,933.30 4.5 
York & Humberside 1,556,402.80 215,308.40 13.8 
North West 1,492,361.60 264,112.40 17.7 
North East 867,642.20 159,968.10 18.4 
TOTAL 13,292,074.40 865,250.20 6.5 
 
 
173 UK House Price Index, LAND REGISTRY, http://landregistry.data.gov.uk/app/ukhpi [https://
perma.cc/PN7U-C9QE]. 
174 The documentation for the data is available at GOV.UK,  supra note 167. 
950 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 917 
For Wales, the data are available publicly on the internet.175 The data are 
reproduced in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Access Land in Wales 
 
County/Authority Name Total Area (ha) Access Land (ha) Percent 
Cardiff 14,948 110 1 
Monmouthshire 73,669 515 1 
Pembrokeshire 101,238 936 1 
Isle of Anglesey 74,891 1,507 2 
The Vale of Glamorgan 33,977 517 2 
Carmarthenshire 223,589 7,803 3 
Flintshire 48,949 1,327 3 
Newport 21,835 978 4 
Neath Port Talbot 45,193 3,483 8 
Gwynedd 91,290 9,189 10 
Wrexham 50,377 5,105 10 
Conwy 72,568 8,288 11 
Caerphilly 27,758 4,022 14 
Ceredigion 181,244 25,695 14 
Denbighshire 84,630 12,182 14 
Rhondda Cynon Taff 37,134 5,304 14 
Swansea 42,123 6,015 14 
Bridgend 25,522 4,213 17 
Powys 430,330 88,073 20 
Merthyr Tydfil 8,674 2,178 25 
Torfaen  12,475 3,261 26 
Blaenau Gwent 10,540 4,193 40 
TOTAL 1,712, 954 194,894 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
175 Open Access Mapping Review Statistics (Sept. 2014), http://naturalresources.wales/media/
677725/open-access-mapping-review-stats-external.xls [https://perma.cc/93QU-5MHA]. 
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C. Empirical Analysis – England 
In our first regressions, shown in Table 3, we use all of the data from 1995–
2014, following the specifications indicated above. 
 
Table 3: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – England  
1995–2014 
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses) 176 
 
 ln(Average Sales Price)
Treatment Effect 
-0.92 
(0.24)***
-0.55 
(0.14)*** 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Period Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Region Specific Trends No Yes
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 
 
The effect of the treatment variable is negative, and it is statistically 
significant. This is true even if we include differential trends across regions 
in the regressions. The latter specification provides some confidence that the 
estimated treatment effect is not simply a continuation of a preexisting trend 
leading to a spurious correlation. The coefficients across the two specifications 
are not statistically significantly different from each other.177 
 
 
 
 
 
176 Clustering the standard errors by region allows for potential serial correlation in the 
housing prices within a region. This technique is useful because period to period observations are 
unlikely to be independent, with the price series exhibiting a kind of inertia. It could also be the 
case that there is some dependence across regions within a given period. To account for this 
possibility, in unreported results, we also calculated standard errors clustered by region and period 
using the method described in A. Colin Cameron, Jonah B. Gelbach & Douglas L. Miller, Robust 
Inference with Multiway Clustering, 29 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 238 (2011). Using this method, our 
results are substantially the same. In no instance does the determination of statistical significance 
vary based on which way the standard errors are clustered. Another paper raises the concern that 
parametric inference techniques are faulty when the number of clusters is small. See A. Colin 
Cameron, Jonah B. Gelbach & Douglas L. Miller, Bootstrap-Based Improvements for Inference with 
Clustered Errors, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 414 (2008). In our case, we have only nine regions, which 
would trigger their concern. If we apply Cameron et al.’s wild cluster bootstrap technique, we 
continue to find that we reject the null of zero price change at a type 1 error of 1%. 
177 Estimating the two regressions as a system of equations and then testing the equality of the 
treatment effect coefficients leads to a p value that exceeds 0.22. 
952 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 917 
To contextualize our results, it is useful to compare the estimated relative 
price decline across regions, based on how much of the land in the region is 
declared to be access land. As a baseline comparison, our data indicate that 
between 2000 and 2014, the average property across all of England increased 
in value by about 113%. This comparison is provided in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
The average loss, as a fraction of the average price appreciation over the 2000–
2014 period, is about 6%, with London and the East of England effectively 
experiencing no loss, and the North East experiencing a loss of about 14% of 
the period’s gain. The effects are slightly smaller when the differential trends 
are accounted for, as seen in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 
To further examine whether the estimated effect is causal, Table 4 
considers whether the estimated effect is merely an artifact picking up a 
departure between the trends in rural housing prices and those of urban 
prices. To account for this, a variable capturing the fraction of regional 
residents who live in rural areas in the post-law change period is included.178 
If the access land designations are simply capturing changes in rural home 
prices in the post-2000 period, the inclusion of this variable should be able to 
sort the two effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
178 Mechanically, this variable is constructed in the same fashion as our treatment effect 
variable (i.e., 0 for all observations pre–December 2000; for all observations from December 2000 
and on, the variable is equal to the rural population variable in the given region). The underlying 
data are derived from a report issued by the UK Office of National Statistics. See Rural and Urban 
Areas: Comparing Lives Using Rural/Urban Classifications fig.5, UK OFF. NAT’L STAT., http://www.
ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/regional-trends/regional-trends/no--43--2011-edition/rural-and-urban-areas--compa
ring-lives-using-rural-urban-classifications---supporting-data.xls [https://perma.cc/24W5-VU46]. 
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Table 4: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – England 
1995–2014 
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses) 
 
 ln(Average Sales Price)
Treatment Effect 
-0.96 
(0.25)***
-0.45 
(0.06)*** 
Rural Population  
  Share x Law Period  
-0.002 
(0.003)
0.004 
(0.001)*** 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Period Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Region Specific Trends No Yes
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
  
To further isolate causality, in Table 5, we examine a number of smaller 
time windows. We start with a very narrow window, namely 1999–2001, which 
involves only a full calendar year of data before and after the legal change in 
December 2000. We also present periods from 1995 through 2001 and 1995 
through 2005. Finally, we present an estimate that stops the sample at the end 
of 2006, out of concern that the worldwide real estate slump beginning in 
2007 might be affecting our results in unexpected ways. Because these shorter 
windows leave insufficient time to credibly estimate region-specific trends, 
we only present the specifications without those trends. 
 
Table 5: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – England 
Varying Time Windows 
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses) 
 
 ln(Average Sales Price)
 1999–2001 1995–2001 1995–2005 1995–2006 
Treatment Effect 
-0.61 
(0.11)***
-1.68 
(0.30)***
-1.13 
(0.20)***
-0.96 
(0.18)*** 
Rural Population 
  Share x Law Period 
-0.00 
(0.00)
-0.00 
(0.00)
0.00 
(0.00)
0.00 
(0.00) 
Regional Fixed   
  Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Period Fixed  
  Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Specific  
  Trends
No No No No 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
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In all of the shorter windows, we continue to find a negative treatment effect 
that is statistically significant, though there is some variability in the estimate 
of the treatment effect. 
We also attempt to account for the fact that the London property market 
is essentially a world market, which might make it inappropriate to include 
the London observations in the sample. We present these results, where the 
London observations are excluded, in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – England 
London Omitted 
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses) 
 
 ln(Average Sales Price)
Treatment Effect 
-0.40 
(0.21)*
-0.43 
(0.08)*** 
Rural Population  
  Share x Law Period  
0.01 
(0.00)**
0.00 
(0.00)*** 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Period Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Region Specific Trends No Yes
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
 
The results that omit London are largely in line with the previous results. 
Thus, it seems unlikely that London is driving our results. 
Lastly, to examine whether the effect we have observed is stable, as 
opposed to, perhaps, diminishing over time (as might be the case, for 
example, if people’s values change when the law is announced due to 
uncertainty regarding how it will be carried out, only to revert to baseline 
after an adjustment period), we break the treatment effect into two separate 
indicators. In the first case, we simply split the post-adoption indicator into 
two equal spans (December 2000–December 2007 and January 2008–
December 2014). In the second case, we split the indicator into the period in 
which the law was passed but not yet fully implemented (December 2000–
October 2005) and the period in which the law was implemented (November 
2005–December 2014). If the price effect is undone in the later period, we 
should expect to find a zero (or even positive) coefficient for the later 
treatment effect, whereas if the price effect largely endures, we should expect 
negative coefficients on both indicators. 
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Table 7: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – England 
Evolving Effects 
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses) 
 
 ln(Average Sales Price)
Early Period 
Later Period 
Dec. 2000–Dec. 2007 
Jan. 2008–Dec. 2014
Dec. 2000–Oct. 2005 
Nov. 2005–Dec. 2014 
Early Period  
  Treatment Effect 
-0.91 
(0.17)***
-1.21 
(0.19)*** 
Later Period  
  Treatment Effect 
-1.01 
(0.35)***
-0.83 
(0.29)*** 
Rural Population  
  Share x Law Period  
-0.00 
(0.00)
-0.00 
(0.00)
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Period Fixed  
  Effects 
Yes Yes 
Region Specific Trends No No
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
 
Breaking the treatment effect into early and late components largely suggests 
that the effect endures over time, as opposed to individuals becoming used to 
the effects of the legal change. 
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D. Empirical Analysis – Wales 
As indicated in Tables 1 and 2 above, England and Wales appear to have 
made very different choices regarding access land, with Wales designating 
almost twice as much land (proportionately) as access land. Since we have the 
treatment variable at a much finer geographic level for Wales, Wales gives us 
the opportunity to isolate the right to roam effect much more precisely. For 
these reasons, we analyze Wales separately from England in Table 8, following 
the same approach as above. 
 
Table 8: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – Wales 
1995–2014 
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses) 
 
 ln(Average Sales Price)
Treatment Effect 
-0.51 
(0.12)***
-0.48 
(0.10)*** 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Period Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Region Specific Trends No Yes
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
 
As with England, we find statistically significant negative treatment effects, 
regardless of whether we account for differential regional trends. The 
difference between the two coefficients is not statistically significant.179 
In terms of gauging the magnitude of the estimated effect, as above, it 
may be useful to compare the losses to the baseline gain in property prices 
over the 2000–2014 period. For Wales, the average appreciation of property 
values over this period is 112%. As can be seen in Figure 3, the magnitude of 
the loss in property values as a share of overall appreciation in the 2000–2014 
period is quite similar to that of England.180 
 
 
179 Estimating the two equations as a system yields a difference in coefficients with a p value > 0.71. 
180 There is virtually no difference between the regional trend and no regional trend 
specifications; therefore, we only present magnitudes based on the no trends model for Wales. 
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Figure 3 
The average magnitude across the regions of Wales is -0.05, whereas the 
maximum loss exceeds 16% of the overall appreciation in the period. The 
Welsh results, then, would seem to further bolster the English results, both 
in terms of direction of the effect and its practical magnitude. 
As with England, there is a potential concern that we are merely picking 
up some differential change in rural land prices. As above, we present results 
where we control for this effect by having a parallel December 2000–onward 
effect that controls for the percent of the region’s population living in a rural 
area.181 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
181 These data come from a statistical bulletin issued by the Welsh government. See Statistical 
Directorate, Welsh Assembly Government, “Rural Wales”—Definitions and How to Choose 
Between Them tbl.1 (2008), http://gov.wales/docs/statistics/2008/080313sb102008en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/TB7F-5L77]. The rural indicator is calculated by subtracting the sum of the percent of each 
region’s population living in large and small towns in the “less sparse context” from 100%. 
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Table 9: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – Wales 
1995–2004 
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses) 
 
 ln(Average Sales Price)
Treatment Effect 
-0.37 
(0.09)***
-0.43 
(0.10)*** 
Rural Population Share x    
  Law Period  
0.20 
(0.03)***
0.07 
(0.03)** 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Period Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Region Specific Trends No Yes
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
 
As we saw with England, controlling for a parallel change having to do with 
rural areas in the period after the roaming law is passed does not affect our 
estimate of the treatment effect of the law. 
Table 10 examines shorter windows around the legal change, following the 
conventions described above. 
 
Table 10: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – Wales 
Varying Time Windows 
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses) 
 
 ln(Average Sales Price)
 1999–2001 1995–2001 1995–2005 1995–2006 
Treatment   
  Effect 
-0.28 
(0.05)***
-0.48 
(0.11)***
-0.51 
(0.11)***
-0.46 
(0.10)*** 
Rural Population   
  Share x Law  
  Period  
0.05 
(0.02)*** 
0.08 
(0.04)** 
0.14 
(0.03)*** 
0.15 
(0.03)*** 
Regional Fixed  
  Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Period  
  Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Specific  
  Trends 
No No No No 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
 
As before, regardless of the window examined, the estimated effect is robust 
and largely focused in the very short window surrounding the legal change. 
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The coincidence of this timing provides some confidence that it is indeed the 
law change that is driving our result. 
To examine the possibility that the initial effect of the law change is 
subsequently undone, we again examine the treatment effect divided across 
two periods as described above. These results are presented in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Effect of the Passage of the 2000 Right to Roam Statute – Wales 
Evolving Effects 
(Standard Errors Clustered by Region in Parentheses) 
 
 ln(Average Sales Price)
Early Period 
Later Period 
Dec. 2000–Dec. 2007 
Jan. 2008–Dec. 2014
Dec. 2000–Oct. 2005 
Nov. 2005–Dec. 2014 
Early Period    
  Treatment Effect 
-0.39 
(0.11)***
-0.48 
(0.13)*** 
Later Period  
  Treatment Effect 
-0.35 
(0.08)***
-0.31 
(0.08)*** 
Rural Population  
  Share x Law Period  
0.20 
(0.03)***
0.20 
(0.03)*** 
Regional Fixed  
  Effects 
Yes Yes 
Time Period Fixed  
  Effects 
Yes Yes 
Region Specific  
  Trends 
No No 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
 
As we found with England, the early effect of the law is comparable to the later 
effect of the law. Thus, there is no evidence that the price effects unwind, even 
in the fairly long term. Instead, it seems that the estimated effects endure. 
As with England, the results for Wales suggest that the passage of the 
right to roam statute in 2000 led to substantial declines in real estate prices 
in those counties and municipal authorities where a relatively large fraction 
of the land area was designated as access land. The fact that most of the 
change occurred quickly after the passage of the statute enhances our 
confidence that the identified relationship can be interpreted causally. 
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E. Policy Implications 
Our findings have important policy implications concerning the right to 
exclude and the right to roam. First, consider the right to exclude. Our study 
shows that the right to exclude is very valuable to property owners, and even 
so-called slight intrusions on owners’ exclusion right in favor of more public 
access seem to come at a real cost to owners. In this regard, testing the impact 
of the right to roam on property value is particularly interesting, because the 
right to roam, as it is designed in England and Wales, only minimally 
interferes with owners’ use of their land. Hence, our findings suggest that the 
right to exclude is of independent value to property owners; it is not a mere 
proxy for use rights, as some property theorists suggest.182 
It bears emphasis that in the United States, private property rights are 
constitutionally protected against government takings. The Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment provides that the government can take private property 
only for a public use and only in exchange for the payment of just 
compensation. No similar protection exists in European countries. As a result, 
European countries that adopted a right to roam were not obligated to pay 
compensation to affected property owners.183 In light of the Takings Clause, 
establishment of a right to roam in the United States would likely be 
different. Enactment of a right to roam falls under the category of regulation; 
it does not involve physical seizure of private plots. As a general rule, regulation 
of property is a legitimate exercise of government power that does not entail 
the payment of compensation. However, if the regulation “goes too far[,] it will 
be recognized as a taking” for which compensation must be paid.184 
Of particular relevance to our study are two important Supreme Court 
cases. In the first, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, the Court ruled that the 
establishment of a navigation easement over a private body of water in Hawaii 
constituted a taking that required the payment of compensation.185 In this 
case, the owner of a private pond converted it to a bay and connected it to a 
navigable marina.186 The government claimed that as a result of the acts of the 
 
182 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 157, at 290 (suggesting that the essence of ownership lies in the 
ability “to set the agenda for a resource” and that the right to exclude is important only insofar as it 
enables owners to decide how to use their property). 
183 The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, c. 37 (Eng. & Wales), is representative of 
this reality, as it is silent with respect to any compensation payable to land owners for the diminution 
in value of their private property. While the United Kingdom has a system of compulsory purchase 
orders that require compensation, such orders are warranted only in the event of a direct acquisition 
of private property through the exercise of eminent domain powers, and not when governmental 
measures result in depreciation of the private owner’s land value. 
184 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
185 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
186 Id. at 166. 
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owner, the private lagoon had become “a navigable water of the United States” 
and was therefore subject to public access.187 Rejecting the government’s 
position, the Supreme Court held that “the [g]overnment’s attempt to create 
a public right of access to the improved pond goes so far beyond ordinary 
regulation or improvement for navigation as to amount to a taking.”188 
The second case is Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.189 There, the 
owners of a beachfront property requested a permit from the California Coastal 
Commission to replace a bungalow that stood on their lot with a larger house.190 
The Commission conditioned the grant of the permit on the owners’ agreement 
to give the public a right of access across their lot, which was situated between 
two public beaches.191 The Supreme Court held that the condition imposed 
by the government in this case was unconstitutional.192 En route to this 
conclusion, the Court explained that “[h]ad California simply required the 
Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available to the public 
on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach, . . . we 
have no doubt there would have been a taking.”193 The Court further noted 
that the establishment of an easement constitutes a taking as it amounts to a 
permanent physical occupation.194 The Court opined that a permanent 
physical occupation occurs “where individuals are given a permanent and 
continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously 
be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station 
himself permanently upon the premises.”195 
Hence, under current takings jurisprudence, legislation that creates a 
public right to roam is likely to be upheld as constitutional only if the 
government pays compensation to all private property owners whose land will 
be affected.196 Our results provide an estimate of the amount the government 
would have to pay private property owners should it decide to grant roaming 
privileges to the public. While, for the reasons we elaborate below, we cannot 
calculate the total compensation amount with pinpoint accuracy, our results 
constitute a useful benchmark for policymakers. 
 
187 Id. at 170. 
188 Id. at 178. 
189 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
190 Id. at 828. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 841-42. 
193 Id. at 831. 
194 Id. at 832-33. 
195 Id. at 832. 
196 See Jess Kyle, Of Constitutions and Cultures: The British Right to Roam and American Property 
Law, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,898, 10,902 (2014) (observing that “[g]iven the Court’s association of 
a public right-of-way in Nollan with a permanent physical occupation, prospects for an American 
right to not simply ‘pass through’ but ‘roam around’ do seem grim”). 
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It is important to understand that our findings go well beyond the debate 
about the right to roam and the takings question. The price effects we report 
have general welfare implications. Our analysis suggests that even measures 
that may seem to have only a trifling effect on the right to exclude can cause 
a drop in property values. This effect must be taken into account whenever 
the government considers land use policies that compromise owners’ right to 
exclude. 
We grant that there is a cultural dimension to the analysis. It is widely 
believed that the right to exclude is more valuable to American property owners 
than to their counterparts in European countries. Accordingly, there is reason 
to believe the adoption of laws and policies that grant greater public access, 
such as the right to roam, in the United States may have an even bigger negative 
impact on real property prices than the one observed in England and Wales. 
Ultimately, however, our study bears on the debate about whether to 
recognize a right to roam in the United States. The results of our study 
indicate that recognizing a right to roam has a significant negative effect on 
real estate prices. This should sound a cautionary note to those who support 
an institution of a right to roam in the United States. That said, our study 
does not, and cannot, on its own, negate the possibility that the enactment of 
a right to roam may be welfare-enhancing. It is theoretically possible that the 
benefit to the public from instituting a right to roam would exceed the loss to 
property owners. But, it is very difficult to estimate the benefit the public 
derives from having the ability to roam. The benefits to hikers, for example, 
are invariably diverse and largely immeasurable. Cultural and historical 
factors likely play a critical role.197 
Another important factor that must enter the discussion is the availability 
of alternatives. The expansive state and federal parks that exist in the United 
States provide ample opportunity for hikers and the public at large to engage 
in recreational outdoor activities, even in the absence of a right to roam. Of 
course, some will argue that the current state of affairs falls short of the gold 
standard and that more public access is needed. In light of the existence of 
the state and national parks in the United States, however, the marginal 
benefit from expanding access by instituting roaming rights may be smaller 
than the marginal benefit in the European scenario, while the marginal harm 
may be greater. 
 
197 Hypothetical-valuation studies have been widely used to value ecological amenities, 
endangered species, etc., which might offer some hope of measuring benefits here. That said, there 
is controversy about whether those measures are credible. See generally Jerry Hausman, Contingent 
Valuation: From Dubious to Hopeless, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2012) (surveying the literature on these 
studies and concluding that they suffer from long-standing problems). 
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A sensible compromise may therefore be to introduce a right to roam only 
in certain areas that are highly attractive to the public and are not normally 
designated as park land. The one example that immediately comes to mind is 
beaches and lakeshores. Lawmakers have long struggled with the challenge of 
public access to beaches and have employed various legal tools, such as the 
public trust doctrine,198 custom,199 and even exactions,200 to expand the right 
of the public to use beaches. Given the public interest in access to beaches, it 
is possible that the recognition of limited roaming rights in such areas may 
prove to be socially desirable. 
Finally, the scope of the right to roam also affects the calculus. The more 
expansive the roaming rights, the greater the negative effect on real estate 
prices is likely to be. As we explained, the scope of the right to roam in 
England and Wales is much more limited than in Scotland and Scandinavia. 
In principle, it is possible to restrict the right to roam even more than 
England and Wales did by placing additional time and place limitations on 
the right. Specifically, a law could limit the public right of passage to certain 
days (e.g., weekends) or seasons (e.g., summer) and allow access only to 
certain areas on the fringes of the designated property. Such measures may 
lower the impact of the right to roam on property prices. At the same time, 
however, they would likely reduce the benefit to the public. 
F. Empirical Limitations and Extensions 
Although our finding of a decline in real estate prices coinciding with the 
passage of the right to roam statute in 2000 is robust across England and 
Wales as well as across various sample time series restrictions, it is possible 
that the result we have identified is being driven by something other than the 
statute’s passage. The most obvious possibility is that the designation of 
access land was endogenous to land values. Although focusing on price 
changes before the land was actually designated in each area mitigates this 
concern, it does not eliminate it altogether. Actors in the real estate market 
might have accurately predicted that public authorities would hesitate in 
designating relatively valuable land (or land in relatively valuable regions). 
To investigate this possibility, one could examine a more micro level of 
analysis, perhaps exploiting the sixty-foot privacy zone included in the 
statute. There are surely some properties that are smaller than sixty square 
feet, which would be effectively exempt from the statute. These properties’ 
values could be used as an even more appropriate within-region control group 
 
198 E.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
199 E.g., State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969). 
200 E.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
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in either a matching design, a regression discontinuity design, or a triple 
differences design. Any of these approaches could strengthen claims of 
causality or credibly unveil the potential underlying endogeneity in our 
present analysis. 
A more fundamental critique of our study involves the use of property 
values as a proxy for the value people assign to the law. If there are concerns 
that markets do not properly capitalize these values into real estate prices, 
either because the actors in the markets are less than rational or because the 
markets are not thick enough for informational efficiency to hold, the present 
project is doomed from the start. Even if those concerns are not founded, one 
could still be concerned that values accruing to individuals not participating 
directly in the real estate market are not sufficiently weighted in this kind of 
approach. This would limit our ability to make any strong welfare claims 
regarding the law itself, and it would provide only some of the inputs 
necessary in making strong claims regarding the value of exclusion versus the 
value of access. 
CONCLUSION 
The right to exclude is considered the touchstone of private property by 
laypersons. For many centuries, legal scholars shared that view. In the last 
several decades, however, the centrality of the right to exclude to the 
institution of private property has been challenged, first by legal realists and 
more recently by progressive property scholars. At present, the world of 
property theory is engulfed in a heated debate between pro-exclusion and 
anti-exclusion theorists. The debate is not merely conceptual; it has far-
reaching implications regarding the extent to which the government can take 
liberties with private property to advance other social goals. For instance, 
contemporary research suggests that the security of property is the key 
determinant of the wealth of nations.201 Notwithstanding the vast scholarship 
on the right to exclude, no one, until now, has tried to estimate the value of 
the right to exclude to property owners and thereby provide an empirical 
foundation for the debate. 
In this Article, we set out to fill that empirical void by measuring, for the 
first time, the value of the right to exclude to property owners. To this end, 
we analyzed the effect of the legislation that recognized a right to roam in 
England and Wales on property values by comparing affected and non-affected 
parcels before and after the legislation. We found that the formalization of the 
 
201 For a series of articles demonstrating that common law property systems lead to stronger capital 
markets and overall economic growth, see Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 
1113, 1116 (1998); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael 
La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285 (2008). 
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right to roam, though only minimally invasive, led to a statistically significant 
and substantively important drop in property values. There are reasons to 
believe that if the United States were to institute a right to roam, the adverse 
effect on property values would be much greater. 
The results of our study have far-reaching implications not only for the 
debate about the centrality of the right to exclude, but also for the burgeoning 
debate in the property literature about the desirability of adopting a right to 
roam, or more generally, expanding public access to private land. Our 
findings adumbrate the potential cost that would befall private property 
owners if their right to exclude were curtailed. 
Let there be no mistake: we are under no illusion that our study will bring 
either scholarly debate to a close. As we pointed out, it is essential to evaluate 
the benefit that may arise from increasing public access to private property in 
order to know the net social effect of laws and regulations that override the 
right to exclude. Furthermore, we are fully aware of the fact that empirical 
research cannot settle philosophical debates about the right and the good. 
That said, our study provides much-needed and long-awaited information 
about the value of the right to exclude that can shape land use policies in the 
future. It also carries a promise for transforming the nature of academic debate 
about private property from a purely theoretical discussion into one that is 
more anchored in empirical research and findings. We believe it would be a 
welcome transformation that would carry the world of property law forward. 
 
